The Many Features of Transnational Private Rule-Making: Unexplored Relationships between Custom, Jura Mercatorum and Global Private Regulation by Cafaggi, Fabrizio





THE MANY FEATURES OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE 
RULE-MAKING:  UNEXPLORED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 

























                                                     
*  Professor of comparative law and regulation at SNA and EUI - on leave from 
University of Trento. I would like to thank Bernardo Sordi, Kathy Nguyen, and 
Mark Patterson for comments on earlier drafts of this article and the participants to 
the University of Pennsylvania colloquium of November 2014.  I would also like to 
express my gratitude to Gabriela Femenia of the International law library of 
University of Pennsylvania for excellent support in the research of primary sources. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
CAFAGGI 9/24/2015  4:04 PM 
876 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 877 
2. COMPLEMENTARITY IN TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE  
  RULE-MAKING: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ............... 884 
3. TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION ......................... 889 
3.1. The Composition of the Private Sphere ......................... 889 
3.2. Conflicts of Interests and Organizational Responses ... 893 
4.  THE PROCEDURAL FEATURES OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE 
REGULATION ....................................................................... 899 
4.1. Standard Setting ........................................................... 899 
4.2. Review and Enforcement Mechanisms ......................... 903 
4.3. Separation of Functions in the Regulatory Process ...... 908 
5. REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS ............................................. 909 
6. USAGES, CUSTOM, AND JURA MERCATORUM .................. 913 
7. COMPARING PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL FORMS OF  
  RULE-MAKING: DIFFERENCES AND COMMON  
  FEATURES ............................................................................ 923 
7.1. Actors............................................................................ 923 
7.2. Procedures .................................................................... 925 
7.3. Instruments .................................................................. 927 
7.4. Effects............................................................................ 931 
8.   AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ............................... 934 


















CAFAGGI 9/24/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RULE-MAKING 877 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Every-day life of businesses and consumers is pervaded by the 
references to global private standards:  from the cars we drive to the 
computers we use, from the food we eat to the movies we watch. 
Private rule-making at the transnational level is increasingly gaining 
scope and traction, quickly expanding in both old and new 
territories, from e-commerce to data protection, from food safety to 
human rights protection, from financial markets to environment, 
from professional regulation to corruption and anti-money 
laundering, from civil aviation to private security.  This is partly the 
result of weaknesses in conventional international public law and 
partly the result of the emergence of new modes of governance.  
Stimulated by the actions of states and private actors, these new 
modes of governance include public, private, and hybrid 
instruments.1  
Private actors engage in transnational rulemaking in different 
forms depending on their objectives, the geographical and 
functional scope, and the effects of the regimes on the entities being 
regulated.2  Some regimes have personal scope since they apply to 
supply chains wherever their participants are located. Other 
regimes have territorial scope and concern, for example, advertising 
in the UK, or lawyering in Europe.   
Private regimes can both set standards for supply chains or 
design and regulate markets.  On the one hand, there are standards 
concerning firms - in particular multinational corporations (MNCs) 
- regulating their own activities and even governance in order to 
ensure compliance in multiple jurisdictions.3  On the other hand, 
                                                     
1  For example, agreements and memoranda of understanding between 
international organizations and private actors whose legal status is neither that of 
exchange contract nor that of an international treaty. 
2  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Private 
Regulation: Legitimacy, Quality, Effectiveness and Enforcement, 8 (Eur. U. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 15/2014, 2014),  http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/ 
1814/33591), [hereinafter A Comparative Analysis]; TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, 
THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 18 (2011); Tim Büthe,  Private Regulation in the Global Economy:  A 
(P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL. 1 (2010); David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 
11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI., 261, 263 (2008); JOHN BRAITHWAITHE & PETER DRAHOS, 
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). 
3  See OECD, INTERCONNECTED ECONOMIES: BENEFITING FROM GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS, (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/interconnected-
economies-GVCs-synthesis.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
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there is a proliferation of new markets privately designed and 
regulated via international electronic platforms.  The more 
conventional stock and commodities exchanges are now 
complemented by electronic trading platforms regulated by private 
firms, associations, by cooperatives where multiple buyers and 
sellers exchange goods and services.  
The emergence of many regulatory regimes is frequently driven 
by the changes in global value chains (GVCs) and in international 
trade.4  GVCs have become the locus of policy implementation 
concerning regulatory issues, since they increasingly trade services 
and transfer technical and managerial capabilities from buyers to 
suppliers.5  Donors, like international institutions, often endow GVC 
leaders with resources to promote policies aimed at facilitating 
smallholders’ access to international markets, reducing poverty, and 
improving environmental conditions on the basis of private 
standards.6  International regulatory policies incorporated in private 
standards are implemented through different forms of cooperation 
between international organizations, MNCs, and civil society 
organizations (CSOs).7 
                                                     
4  See Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World,  
21 REV. INT’L POL. ECON., (2014); Stefano Ponte & Timothy Sturgeon, Explaining 
Governance in Global Value Chains: A Modular Building Theory Effort, 21 REV. INT’L 
POL. ECON., 79, 86 (2014); Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 
12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON., (2005) [hereinafter Governance of GVC]. 
5  See OECD, WTO, & WORLD BANK GROUP, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: 
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES (2014), http://www. 
oecd.org/tad/gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf; WTO, TEMASEK FOUNDATION & FUNG 
GLOBAL INSTITUTE, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD (Deborah Elms & 
Patrick Low eds., 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
booksp_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf. (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
6  See, e.g., FAO, FAO STRATEGY FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3444e/i3444e.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 
2015); FAO, FAO Strategy for Partnership with Civil Society Organizations (2013), 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3443e/i3443e.pdf; see also IFAD, DEEPENING 
IFAD’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR (2011), 
http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/104/e/EB-2011-104-R-4-Rev-1.pdf. (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2015). 
7  See Gary Gereffi, A Global Value Chain Perspective on Industrial Policy and 
Development in Emerging Markets, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L., 433, 454 (2014) (stating 
that “[p]ublic governance will likely be called upon to play a stronger role in 
supplementing and reinforcing corporate codes of conduct, product certifications, 
process standards, and other voluntary, non-governmental types of private 
governance that have proliferated in the last two decades, and multi-stakeholder 
initiatives involving both public and private actors will arise to deal with collective 
action problems.”).  For a broader conceptual framework, see generally, the famous 
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Transnational private standards are voluntary; most of them 
become binding when regulated entities subscribe to them or join 
the organization managing the regime (e.g. become members).  The 
adoption of standards is voluntary but compliance is mandatory.8  
Whether these regimes effectively monitor compliance and enforce 
standards once violations arise varies across sectors.9  The focus of 
these standards is regulatory.10  They regulate externalities like 
environmental harms, product safety, human rights violations in 
global supply chains;11 they contribute to stability and transparency 
in financial markets.12  The same industry (the diamond industry for 
                                                     
piece by Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory 
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
REGULATION, 44 (2009). 
8  See, e.g., THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf (last accessed Mar. 26, 2015) 
(stating “(5) b): Adoption of the principles by a financial institution is voluntary but 
once such adoption has been made, the adopting entity must take all appropriate 
steps to implement and comply with the principles,” and drawing the distinction 
between transnational private regulation and international soft law).  
9  See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Measuring Effectiveness of Transnational 
Private Regulation, 1, 74-76 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508684 
(last accessed Mar. 26, 2015). 
10  See A Comparative Analysis, supra note 2 at 18.       
11  See, e.g., THE WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, Standard Guidance: (COP 27) 
Kimberley Certification Process and World Diamond Council System of Warranties at 2, 
available at http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/files/Kimberley-Process-
Certification-Scheme-and-WDC-SoW-RJC-Guidance-draftv1.pdf (last visited Mar. 
26, 2015) (“In addition to KP and SoW adherence, all diamond and jewelry industry 
organizations and their members have adopted the following principles of self-
regulation, obliging them to: trade ‘only with companies that include warranty 
declarations on their invoices;’ not buy diamonds from suspect sources or unknown 
suppliers, or which originate in countries that have not implemented the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme; not buy diamonds from any sources that, after a 
legally binding due process system, have been found to have violated government 
regulations restricting the trade in conflict diamonds; not buy diamonds in or from 
any region that is subject to an advisory by a governmental authority indicating 
that conflict diamonds are coming from or available for sale in such region, unless 
diamonds have been exported from such region in compliance with the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme; not knowingly buy, sell or assist others to buy or sell 
conflict diamonds; ensure that all company personnel that buy or sell diamonds are 
well informed regarding trade resolutions and government regulations restricting 
the trade in conflict diamonds.”).   
12  See IFRS FOUNDATION, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK (2013), http://www.ifrs. 
org/DPOC/Documents/2013/Due_Process_Handbook_Resupply_28_Feb_2013_
WEBSITE.pdf (describing the function of financial reporting standards); see also 
ISDA, IMPROVING REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY OF GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKETS: 
KEY PRINCIPLES (2015), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NzI4NQ==/ 
Improving%20Regulatory%20Transparency%20FINAL.pdf.       
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example) can at the same time be the subject of different 
transnational private regimes, some focused on market design, 
others on regulatory objectives.13  When they relate to the market 
making, the standards define general rules for traders in order to 
increase efficiency, reduce transaction costs and information 
asymmetries, decrease risks of opportunistic behavior, and enhance 
mutual trust both among traders and between traders and 
consumers.14  When they concern regulation, they address 
externalities, collective action problems and govern production or 
access to global public goods.15 
The fields of application go well beyond those traditionally 
occupied by ‘jura mercatorum,’ including agriculture, human rights, 
social and labor regulation, environment, and the more 
conventional areas, such as finance, banking, professions, and trade, 
including e-commerce.16  These private regimes are sector specific 
but not self-contained.  They presuppose the existence of 
international and domestic institutions that can support their 
                                                     
13  Interestingly, within the same industry we can find examples of TPR and 
examples of custom in very close business communities.  The World Diamond 
Council with the System of Warranties represents one of the most well-known 
forms of transnational private regulation along global supply chains.  On the other 
hand, communities of merchants like the Orthodox Jewish community in New York 
constitutes one of the most studied phenomena of contemporary law merchants. 
See Haufler, infra note 64; The Kimberly process certification scheme: An innovation 
in Global governance and conflict prevention. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 
149 (1992).     
14  Daniel Spulber, Solving the Circular Conundrum: Communication and 
Coordination in Internet Markets, 104 NW. U. L. REV.  537, 542 (2010) (“[F]irms acting 
as intermediaries enhance transaction efficiency by pooling and diversifying risks, 
lowering the costs of matching and searching, alleviating adverse selection, 
mitigating moral hazard and opportunism, and supporting commitment through 
delegation of authority.”).   
15  See, e.g., Responsible Jewelry Council’s activities contribute to “supply chain 
due diligence, legal compliance, anti-corruption, better environmental 
management and reduction of impacts, safe and healthy workplace, rights and 
benefits for workers and impacted stakeholders, community engagement and 
development, Improved market access, consumer confidence.”  RJC Theory of 
Change, available at http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/files/4-RJC-Theory-of-
Change.pdf. (Apr. 4, 2015). 
16  I use the term jura mercatorum to capture the idea that they are multiple and 
may differ depending on the type of commodity or services.  Hence, I do not 
subscribe to the idea that a single and common lex mercatoria is in place.  I use the 
term jus rather than lex to express the plurality of sources including private and 
scholarly sources. 
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functioning.17  They interact by both giving rise to conflicts or by 
mutually reinforcing one another.18  The premise of the analysis that 
follows is that of institutional complementarity rather than that of 
separate and autonomous private orderings.  The conceptual puzzle 
concerns the definition of different types of complementarity 
between private and public actors.19  
Is the expansion of transnational private rule-making simply an 
evolution of more conventional forms of custom and jus mercatorum 
or does it depart from these forms of private rule-making?  In the 
latter case is there a common denominator of current forms of 
transnational private rule-making? How does private rule-making 
correlate with international and domestic public legal orders? Do 
they constitute separate private orderings? Do they complement, 
supplement or replace public legal orders? What is the combination 
between legal and non-legal norms? Not only these questions have 
theoretical relevance but they also shape important regulatory 
policy choices at the international level concerning legitimacy, 
compliance and enforcement of global private standards?20 
Private regulatory regimes are often the outcome of an 
interactive process with international and domestic public 
organizations.21  Examples range from the collaboration between 
IOSCO and ISDA on the regulation of over the counter (OTC) 
derivative markets to collaboration between International Civil 
                                                     
17  See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria. Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.  
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 458 (2007); see also, Kenneth Abbott, International 
Organisations and International Regulatory Cooperation: Exploring the Links, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: 
THE CASES OF THE OECD AND THE IMO, 17 (2014). For a different perspective 
claiming the independence and autonomy of lex mercatoria, see CLIVE SCHMITOFF, 
COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC CLIMATE (1977); Roy Goode, Rule, 
Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 539, 
546 (2005); ROY GOODE, THE HAMLYN LECTURES: COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT 
MILLENNIUM 545 (1998). 
18  See Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 127 (2008); Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational business 
interaction: Conceptualization and framework for analysis, 8 REG. & GOV. 1 (2014). 
19  As Avinash Dixit puts it, “the issue in the study of different governance 
institutions is not the old-style contrast ‘market versus government.’ Rather it is the 
interaction of the whole system of governance and transactions—what 
combinations work well, under which conditions.” Avinash Dixit, Governance 
Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV.  5, 8 (2009). 
20  See A Comparative Analysis, supra note 2 at 1. 
21  See Jurgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy- Commercial Law 
as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 709 (2008). 
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aviation organization (ICAO) and International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) on civil aviation standards and compliance.22  
The effectiveness of transnational private regulation, TPR, often 
depends on the existence of good collaborative platforms among 
domestic public regulators.23  If differences across jurisdictions are 
significant, transnational private standards might not be able to 
work even if they comply with the strictest domestic regulation.  In 
these situations, active cooperation with transnational regulatory 
networks or international organizations is needed. 
Many of the new private regimes complement those developed 
by traders are conventionally labeled as lex mercatoria.24  For 
example, rules concerning quality and prices are now 
complemented by rules related to safety and environmental 
protection.25  In areas such as banking and professional regulations, 
there is some overlap, a significant transformation of conventional 
private rule-making with an increasing regulatory component.26  In 
other areas such as agriculture, good practices are incorporated into 
codes of conduct that suppliers are required to comply with in order 
to be certified.27  Other regimes, instead, cover new areas, pursuing 
primarily a regulatory function, as in the case of environmental 
protection and sustainability or internet governance and electronic 
commerce.  In some instances they address directly the regulated 
entities, in other instances they constitute meta-rules directed at 
private standard setters.28 
                                                     
22  See the comments and suggestions given by ISDA to IOSCO on cross-border 
regulatory cooperation in derivatives, International Organization of Securities 
Commissions [IOSCO], IOSCO Task Force on Cross-Border Regulation Consultation 
Report, IOSCO Doc. CR09/2014 (2014). [hereinafter ISDA Comments].    
23  Id. (suggesting principles IOSCO should adopt in order to promote cross 
border regulatory cooperation. ISDA examines the toolkit of regulatory cooperation 
proposed by IOSCO including national treatment, pass-porting, and 
benchmarking, expressing a preference for the last). 
24  See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE NELLO SPECCHIO DEL 
DIRITTO, 43 (2005). 
25  An example of these developments is the evolution of IATA in its standard 
setting function.  
26  GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2013). 
27  See, e.g., GLOBALG.A.P., GENERAL REGULATIONS (4th ed. 2012), http://www1. 
globalgap.org/north-america/upload/Standards/IFA/v4_0-1/120206_gg_gr_ 
part_i_eng_v4_0-1.pdf (providing a mandatory set of regulations for members).  
28  See, e.g., ISEAL Alliance, ISEAL CREDIBILITY PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES FOR 
CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS SYSTEMS 4 (2013), http:// 
www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/Credibility%20Principles%20v1.0%20l
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Transnational private regulatory regimes –it is contended- do 
not represent an alternative to jus mercatorum since their functional 
focus is regulation driven by market failures rather than a set of 
prescriptions related to individual transactions between market 
participants.  They integrate current public market regulation or 
contribute to the creation of new markets through market design.29   
The multifarious forms of transnational private rule-making 
pose daunting questions concerning their origins, functions and 
scope.  This article addresses the different forms of transnational 
private rule-making; it tries to examine their differences and the 
consequences for their normative foundations and policy objectives.  
After a brief historical overview, section I analyses transnational 
private regulation (TPR), and section II examines usages, customs 
and jura mercatorum.  Section III presents a comparative assessment 
between TPR and custom.  Section IV defines an agenda for future 





                                                     
ow%20res.pdf (directing standard setters focusing on sustainability: “The ISEAL 
Credibility Principles apply to all standards systems that focus on sustainability 
performance and that incorporate a standard and a mechanism for assuring 
compliance with that standard. . . . While these Principles offer a high level 
overview, additional guidance and information about the interpretation and 
application of these Principles is necessary and is captured in current and future 
ISEAL Codes of Good Practice.  The Credibility Principles are not intended to be 
used in isolation as a normative evaluation tool.  In applying these Principles, 
stakeholders should consider how the Credibility Principles are embraced and 
incorporated by a standards system, rather than attempting to determine whether 
a standards system meets – or complies with – the Credibility Principles.  Standards 
systems may choose to combine these Principles in different ways, recognizing that 
there are tensions and trade-offs between the various Principles, e.g. between the 
rigor of a system and how accessible it is.”). 
29  The distinction between market design and market regulation is not as clear-
cut as neoclassical economics claims it to be.  Within the regulatory function of 
private regimes I include rules concerning access and use of resources, both 
material and immaterial, like environment and knowledge.  Examples of private 
standards related to market regulation include sustainability standards concerning 
safety, labor and environmental regulation that go beyond international and 
domestic law and ensure a higher degree of harmonization for MNCs operating 
across multiple national jurisdictions. 
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2. COMPLEMENTARITY IN TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RULE-MAKING: 
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
  
The existence of global private law making forms is not new.  It 
dates back to the middle ages, when merchants, artisans, and 
farmers were collectively conferred regulatory and often normative 
power by the public authorities to regulate business relationships 
and commerce between domestic and foreign traders.  Towns 
conferred ‘çorporationes’ (guilds) power to regulate fairs and 
commerce but also prices, qualities and the labor market.30  Crowns 
conferred private entities power to regulate fairs and later to govern 
colonies through ‘statuta’ and charters.31  At the same time, 
merchants, artisans, and farmers created their own customary rules, 
independently from any institutional support within guilds but also 
independently from guilds.32 New contracts, like commenda and 
compagnia, were created and standardized by merchants with the 
crucial contribution of Italian notaries.   Clearly, the absence of a 
single authority, like the modern regulatory state, presents 
difficulties for such historical comparison, as the concept of public 
and private has transitioned and changed over time.33   
The conceptual framework for inter-temporal comparison of 
global private law making ought to take into account the changing 
relationship between local and global legal systems.  The role of 
custom in medieval times must be framed within the relationship 
                                                     
30  Avner Greif et. al, Coordination Commitment, and Enforcement: the Case of the 
Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745, 749 (suggesting that merchant guilds 
permitted foreign merchants to trade with the merchants of the town’s guild.  “If 
the purpose of the guilds was to create monopoly power for the merchants and to 
increase their bargaining power with the rulers, why did powerful rulers during the 
late medieval period cooperate with alien merchants to establish guilds in the first 
place?”). 
31  See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion 
of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 708 (comparing the 
English crown in relation to St. Yves or the French in relation to the fair of 
Champagne). [hereinafter St. Ives]. 
32  Michaels, supra 17 at, 447-68; Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State 
Governance, 1 UTAH L. REV. 31 (2010). 
33  See John F. Padgett, Early Capitalism and State Formation, in THE EMERGENCE 
OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS, 115, 119 (2012) (suggesting a process of co-
evolution of markets and states. Even more dramatic changes have occurred in the 
private sphere with the creation of corporate entities and the development of global 
supply chains.); Henry Hansmann et. al, Law and Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.  
1335 (2006). 
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between jus commune and jura propria.34  The role of transnational 
custom nowadays must instead be framed between public 
international law and transnational private law.  
The coexistence and interaction between jus commune and jura 
propria characterized many legal orders in continental Europe.35  
Private actors played a role in the development of both.  The guild 
system as it developed in medieval Italy and spread across Europe 
in the twelfth, thirteen, and fourteen century represents a clear 
illustration of private actors entrusted with regulatory, tax and 
sanctioning power.36  In some instances there was even coincidence 
between town governments and guilds; for example, the members 
of the guilds were running town governments.  In other instances 
there was separation between the guilds and town governments, 
albeit close collaboration between the two.37  Guilds regulated trade, 
                                                     
34  Jus commune is the medieval set of common rules applied in continental 
Europe coming from Roman law (the Justinian Digest) and canon law; jura propria 
are the local legal orders designed and administered by towns and cities.  The two 
were continuously interacting.  See DAVID IBBETSON, COMMON LAW AND JUS 
COMMUNE (2001); R.C. VAN CANAEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE 
LAW (1992). 
35  See PAOLO GROSSI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO MEDIEVALE 223, 235 (2006) (“Jus 
commune has a deeper penetration also in the most hostile and closed areas of jus 
proprium: think to Venice that claims to be founded on the sea and for this reason 
able to avoid any influence from mainland, and yet compelled to face the common 
legal heritage.”) (translation by author). 
36  See Sylvia L. Thrupp, The Gilds, in 3 ECONOMIC ORGANISATION AND POLICIES 
IN THE MIDDLE AGES 230, 232 (“Town governments were then making increasingly 
systematic use of gilds in general administrative work, treating the officers as quasi-
public officials.”).  The double identity of the guilds as both private and semi-public 
is well captured by the description of the officers. Id. at 238 (“They were an organ 
of the commune and they were a private group concerned with technical and trade 
interests.”); see also Avner Greif, Institutional and Impersonal Exchange from Communal 
to Individual Responsibility, 158 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 168, 283 n.20 (2002) 
(“[I]n many towns the mercantile and municipal organizations were identical, since 
the merchant guild was the governing body of the borough.”) 
37  The conventional examples are Florence, Bologna, and Milan.  The first was 
characterized by a high degree of coincidence between guilds and town 
government, the latter by the separation.  “According to Valsecchi, who dedicated 
one of his early book to this subject, the process by which corporations would come 
to conquer fully or partially the control over the City start swith the establishment 
among them of a union or a confederation, but then would then progress along 
three different stages.  An example of of the first stage is the one of Milan, where 
the confederation, founded in the area of St. Ambrose, failed in the process without 
reaching the control of the City, nor exercising a strong political influence over it, 
rather it aimed mainly at preventing the municipality to interfere in the fields that 
corporations want strictly reserved to themselves.  In the second group, the 
proposed prototype is Bologna, where the corporations organized as a political and 
military force are able to achieve control over the City.  But they [ . . . ] can not 
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prices, quality and, to a limited extent, even product safety.38  Guilds 
enacted statuta that could be the expression of autonomous 
normative power or the result of a ‘‘delegation” based on the 
conferral of privileges.39  Their normative power was only limited 
by jus commune.40  Guilds’ regulatory activities differ from 
customary law, which developed without any formal ‘delegation’ 
by town governments or other ‘public’ authorities.41  Corporationes 
(guilds) had both a ‘delegated’ and an autonomous power to 
regulate trade and production.42  
Medieval fairs and their regulation represent another example 
of trade regulation by private actors entrusted with regulatory 
                                                     
achieve the result of having the City their own property, and can not prevent 
foreign elements to be part of it, and therefore, in order to protect their position, 
opposed to the old Comune maius their own vision, namely the City of the people 
(comune del popolo).  In the third group, finally, where Florence is the best known 
example, the political ascension of the art guilds reaches its climax:  after a path 
fairly similar to Bologna’s one, the art guilds could, with the well-known law of 
1282, to ensure the full control of the City, excluding any other constitutency.” 
(translation by author)   Gino Luzzatto, Corporazione, in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO, 
669 (1962). 
38  See Thrupp, supra note 38, at 230-32.  
39  Statuta were legal acts that had binding effects over members of guilds and 
beyond. In particular, statute enacted by merchants regulated both internal 
relationships among merchants and external relationships between merchants and 
third parties.  
40  “Mercatores et alii artificaes possunt facere inter se statuta et ista statute 
sunt confirmata a jure communi et ideo non est necesse quod confirmetur per legem 
municipalem . . . .” (Merchants and other artisans may adopt statuta and these act 
are confirmed by jus commune, thus authorization by municipal law is not required 
. . . .)  But then he specified, “non possunt statuere quod sit natura iter et evidentem 
iniustum . . . .  Item non possunt statuere contra jus publicum totius civitatis.” (They 
cannot regulate what should be the natural path nor what is unfair . . . .  Similarly 
they cannot regulate against the public law of the  law of the city.) (translation by 
author) n. 4, Lugduni, MDXLIV, c. 32 v. quoted in Vito Piergiovanni, Statuti Diritto 
Comune e Processo Mercantile, in NORME, SCIENZA E PRATICA GIURIDICA TRA GENOVA 
E L’OCCIDENTE MEDIEVALE E MODERNO 1105, 1108-09 nn.17 & 20 (2012). 
41  They were both part of jus mercatorum.  See FRANCESCO GALGANO, STORIA DEL 
DIRITTO COMMERCIAL 38 (1976) (“Fonti del jus mercatorum erano gli statuti delle 
corporazioni mercantili, le consuetudini mercantili, la giurisprudenza della curia 
dei mercanti.”) (Sources of the law merchants are the acts of merchants guilds, 
merchants customs, and jurisprudence of merchants courts) (translated by author). 
42  See Piergiovanni, supra note 40, at 1108 n.15 (stating “Sul tema della potestà 
condendi statuta Baldo, seguendo una tradizione dottrinale ormai consolidata, non 
dubita che essa spetti alla corporazione senza necessita’ di una superiore 
conferma.”) (on the subject of the regulatory power, Baldo following a well 
established academic approach, does not doubt that it belongs to the guilds without 
any confirmation by higher authorities) (translation by author). 
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power.43  Unlike guilds, which enacted mainly local regulation, fairs 
had a number of transnational regulatory aspects in relation to the 
regulated entities.44 Their regulatory power was conferred by the 
local public authority to the church or to other communities of 
private actors.45  They not only regulated the transactions in the 
trade, but also the liability and the sanctions for participants 
committing violations.46  In some instances, the role of collective 
responsibility in the trade became highly important, giving rise to a 
system where the entire community was made responsible for the 
default of an individual member.47  As for example, when a trader 
delivered defective goods or did not pay the price and the 
community was liable.48  
The delegation of normative power to private actors has been 
used repeatedly after the middle ages.  The colonial expansion, for 
example, was characterized by the use of corporate entities with 
                                                     
43  See O. Verlinden, Markets and Fairs, in THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF EUROPE FROM THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE VOLUME 3: ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE AGES 119–54, 133 (M.M. Postan, E.E. 
Rich and E. Miller eds., 1963) (discussing the regulatory framework for Medieval 
fairs). 
44  See Id. at 132 (“ . . . at the end of the twelfth century and during the first half 
of the  thirteenth, the Champagne fairs were indeed the centre of the commercial 
activity of the western world.“). 
45  See Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the 
Medieval ‘Law Merchant’, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 693–694 (“The king and abbot 
had significant authority over the establishment of legal principles, the resolution 
of disputes, and the enforcement of the fair court’s judgments.”). 
46  See Verlinden, supra note 43 at 132 (noting that trade at fairs “must have 
been subjected to a fairly strict control on the part of the royal agents who 
superintended the customs store-rooms, which were “a kind of bonded 
warehouse”).   
47  This is the so-called reprisal:  “ . . . the reprisal consisted of a sanction that 
differed from the standard penalty, taking the form of an exclusion and interdiction 
of all the defaulting debtor’s co-citizens  from the fair.” Maura Fortunati, The Fairs 
Between Lex Mercatoria and Ius Mercatorum, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL 
LAW 143 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005). 
48  See Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to 
Individual Responsibility, 158 J. INST’L &  THEORETICAL ECON., 168, 169–170 (2002) 
(discussing the collective responsibility system and noting that an entire 
community would be held liable for the default of an individual community 
member); Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, Individual Enforcement of Collective 
Liability in Premodern Europe: Comment, 158 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 205, 205 
(2002) (examining the institution of communal responsibility for the debts of 
individual merchants  across merchants’ associations and towns). 
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governmental responsibilities, as the case of East and West Indian 
companies show.49 
Both historical and contemporary analysis demonstrates that 
private legal regimes have never been fully independent from the 
public sphere.  Well before the formation of the nation states, public 
authorities interacted with private actors in regulating markets, 
trades, and what today is called welfare (health care, education, 
public housing, and care for elderly the and disabled).50  Even after 
the formation of the nation states, collaborative rule-making 
between public and private actors has taken place.  States have 
promoted, steered, and orchestrated the activities of private actors.51  
What constitutes the public sphere has undoubtedly changed 
radically over time.  The private sphere has also transformed over 
the centuries.  When examining the different forms of regulatory 
power-sharing between the public and private spheres, one has to 
be aware of the changing meanings of those terms, and in particular 
the entry of new players in the last quarter of the 20th century.  Yet 
it is possible to identify some common threads for interpreting the 




                                                     
49  See, ex plurimis, PHILIP STERN, THE COMPANY STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 93 (2011).  In 
relation to the Dutch East India Company, see John Padgett, Country as Global 
Market: Netherlands, Calvinism and the Joint Stock Company, in THE EMERGENCE OF 
ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS 208, 226 (John F. Padgett & Walter W. Powell eds., 
2012). 
50  See John R. Commons, American Shoemakers, 1648–1695: A Sketch of Industrial 
Evolution, 24 Q. J. ECON., 39, 39 (1909) (demonstrating how the boot and shoe makers 
responded to commercial and industrial changes by seeking refuge provided by 
protective organizations). 
51  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International 
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration 
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 501 (2009) (suggesting that the 
“Transnational New Governance” is well suited to international regulation because 
it places fewer demands on intergovernmental organizations and states); Kenneth 
W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards 
Institutions in the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 44–
45 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (discussing examples of the non-state 
and public-private governance arrangements that began in the 1980s to implement 
standards for global production in the areas of labor rights, human rights, and the 
environment).  For an historical perspective, see generally GOVERNMENT AND 
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION (Edward Ballesein & David Moss 
eds., 2009). 
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3. TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION 
 
3.1. The Composition of the Private Sphere 
 
Transnational private regulatory regimes are created by private 
actors, in collaboration, rather than in competition with public 
entities.  Not only do they define standards to regulate firms’ 
behavior, but they also both define organizational fields and 
partition the transnational regulatory space.52  Private standards 
state more or less clearly their regulatory objectives and define, often 
with some approximations, a metric to evaluate the effectiveness of 
regulatory performances.53  They aim at changing the status quo and 
improving the conditions of regulatory beneficiaries, including:  
increasing consumer safety, decreasing environmental pollution, 
enhancing human rights protection, granting smallholders access to 
international markets and global supply chains, banning the 
extraction of minerals in conflict zones, reducing corruption and 
money laundering, promoting financial stability and mitigating 
systemic financial risks, and ensuring access and use of internet.54   
                                                     
52  See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. 
SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983) (discussing the isomorphic processes that lead sets of 
organizations to become increasingly similar through rationalization and 
bureaucratization once they have emerged as a field). 
53  See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Strijbis Foundation Report, 
Measuring the effectiveness of private regulatory organizations, (Oct. 3, 2014) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508684 (stating the ways in which private standards 
evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory performances).      
54  In relation to the Internet, see, e.g., Section 2. Core Values, in BYLAWS FOR 
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS: A CALIFORNIA 
NONPROFIT PUBLIC-BENEFIT CORPORATION, (as amended July 30, 2014), available at 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en. 
“In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the 
decisions and actions of ICANN: 
1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, 
and global interoperability of the Internet. 
2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made 
possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters 
within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global 
coordination. 
3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination 
functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that 
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Who are the global private regulators? Enterprises and trade 
associations, professionals, and civil society organizations (CSOs). 
Industries are often complemented by civil society organizations 
and non-governmental bodies.  The single stakeholder model, with 
a single constituency, typically an industry or a profession, has been 
more recently complemented by the multi-stakeholder model where 
industries, CSOs, and often governments convene, trying to 
accommodate diverging objectives and conflicting interests.55  The 
most common legal form is nonprofit.56  
Who are the regulated? Ever more frequently, regulated entities 
are the global chains rather than individual firms.57  There is a shift 
                                                     
reflect the interests of affected parties. 
4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the 
functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels 
of policy development and decision-making. 
5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to 
promote and sustain a competitive environment. 
6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain 
names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest. 
7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that 
(i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) 
ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy 
development process. 
8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and 
objectively, with integrity and fairness. 
9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, 
as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from 
those entities most affected. 
10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through 
mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness. 
11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that 
governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and 
duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' 
recommendations.” 
55  See Lucy Koechlin & Richard Calland, Standard setting at the cutting edge: an 
evidence-based typology for multi-stakeholder initiatives, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS 
STANDARD SETTERS 84, 84-85 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009) (describing multi-
stakeholder initiatives).   
56  See Kevin E. Davis, Privatizing the adjudication of international commercial 
disputes: the relevance of organizational form, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL 
REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 211, 218 (Fabrizio Cafaggi 
ed., 2011) (listing well-known international commercial arbitration institutions that 
are organized as not-for-profit entities). 
57  For example, the World Diamond Council System of Warranties requires “ 
. . . that all consignment of diamonds, whether rough, polished or set in jewellery 
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from individual firms to groups of enterprises or to the entire supply 
chain.58  This change is driven by the need for effective regulation 
across national jurisdictional boundaries when chain leaders 
outsource activities to suppliers located in different jurisdictions.  
Private standards are addressed to the MNC and its whole supply 
chain linked via contracts.  Even when the regulated is only the 
individual firm, the implementation of the standards often requires 
taking into account interdependencies between firms along the 
entire chain, and, as a result, regulatory networks are deployed.  The 
chain leader is made responsible to ensure compliance with the 
standards by the suppliers in many due diligence regimes.59  Hence, 
for example, if corruption takes place at the level of subcontracting 
the main contractor can be held liable for failure to monitor and 
ensure appropriate oversight or to set up the appropriate internal 
management system.  In the agri-food sector processors and/or 
retailers may be held liable when pandemics arise because of 
process standards violations by farmers, located upstream in the 
supply chain not in privity of contract. 
Compared to the conventional view that connects the private 
production of rules to merchants and the industry, the 
contemporary regimes are characterized by a much stronger 
presence of CSOs.60  On one hand, transnational CSOs actively 
                                                     
be accompanied by a written warranty on all invoices through the supply chain.” 
This approach is underlined in the OECD Guidelines:  “In spite of the fragmented 
production process in the supply chain, and independent from their position or 
leverage over suppliers, companies are not insulated from the risk of contributing 
or being associated with adverse impacts occurring at various points in the mineral 
supply chain”. OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF 
MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH RISK AREAS 16 (2d. ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter OECD Due Diligence Guidance], available at http://www.oecd. 
org/corporate/mne/mining.htm.   
58  The trend is quite clear in certification regimes where chain of custody and 
group certification are becoming the rule.  See, for example, the Responsible Jewelry 
Council Chain of Custody, the Fair Trade Chain of Custody, the PEFC Chain of 
Custody Forest Based Products-Requirements, The Global Gap Chain of Custody 
Standard, and the Marine Stewardship Council Chain of Custody Standard Default 
Version.  
59  See, e.g., OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 57, at 20 (providing 
guidance for a model supply chain policy for carrying out a responsible global 
supply chain of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas).  
60  See Anne Peters, Till Forster & Lucy Koechlin, Towards Non-State Actors as 
Effective, Legitimate, and Accountable Standard-Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS 
STANDARD SETTERS 544, 552 (Peters et al. eds., 2009) (discussing “the shift towards 
more synergetic relationships between public and private actors”). 
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participate in regulatory processes led by public entities.61  On the 
other hand, CSOs devise their own regimes, which sometimes 
compete with but most of the time complement the public regimes.62  
CSOs stimulate the birth of regimes, as in the case of conflict 
minerals, forestry, and sustainability.63  Furthermore, they monitor 
existing regimes and denounce violations and breaches, as do, for 
example happens in the field of human rights with Amnesty 
International, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch.64  The 
strategies may differ, but often CSOs campaign first, promoting 
boycotts in market sensitive areas that induce multinationals to take 
initiatives and define regulatory regimes to protect their reputation 
and to preserve market values.65  They then seek to build coalitions 
with industry and governments to establish new regulatory 
regimes, in order to reduce and mitigate the consequences of the 
human rights violations, environmental harms, and food safety 
crises that sparked the boycotts. 
The growing role of CSOs contributes to extend the 
representation of interests affected by transnational private regimes, 
thus increasing inclusiveness and participation in transnational 
                                                     
61  See Sabino Cassese, The Global polity: Global Dimensions of Polity and the 
Rule of Law, (2012) [hereinafter Cassese, Global Polity]. 
62  See David Vogel, Taming Globalization? Civil Regulation and Corporate 
Capitalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, 472, 472 
(David Coen et al. eds., 2010) (defining civil regulation and describing the actors 
involved); A Comparative Analysis, supra note 2, at 31. 
63  In relation to certification, see Tim Bartley & Shawna Smith, Communities of 
practice as cause and consequence of transnational governance: the evolution of social and 
environmental certification, in TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES: SHAPING GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, 347, 350 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2015) 
(discussing social and environmental certification associations and other 
organizations that are involved in the activity but are not dedicated certification 
associations); Graeme Auld, CONSTRUCTING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: THE RISE AND 
EVOLUTION OF FOREST, COFFEE, AND FISHERIES CERTIFICATION (2014). 
64  In relation to conflict minerals and the role of CSOs, see Virginia Haufler, 
Transnational Business Governance and the Management of Natural Resources, in 
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES 16 (2012), available at 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/24 (explaining the differences 
between supply chain regimes in diamonds and other metals, specifically tin, 
tantalum, and gold). 
65  See Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can non-state global governance be 
legitimate? An analytical framework, in REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 1.4 355 (2007); T. 
Bartley, Certification as a mode of regulation, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION 441 ( D. Levi Faure ed., 2011); Axel Marx, Global Governance and the 
Certification Revolution: Types, Trends, and Challenges, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION 604 (D. Levi Faure ed., 2011); Auld, supra note 63.   
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regulation.66  Consumers, investors, workers, human rights 
stakeholders, and organizations have created transnational 
communities.67  They started developing their own standards and 
managed to “persuade” multinationals to adopt these standards.  
CSOs also participate in different capacities to set standards, led by 
industries.  Such expansion increases the heterogeneity of interests 
in transnational regulatory processes, changing the identity and 
features of private regulation. 
 
3.2. Conflicts of Interests and Organizational Responses 
 
  The transnational private sphere is heterogeneous, replete of 
conflicts about both objectives and instruments.68  This diversity is 
reflected in the nature of transnational communities that have 
emerged and are involved in regulatory processes.69  Within private 
regulation, different views may exist about trade-offs between 
regulatory objectives and instruments’ choices.70 First, the content of 
conflicts will be examined followed by an analysis of institutional 
responses.  
                                                     
66  See Cassese, GLOBAL POLITY, supra note 61; Richard Stewart, Remedying 
Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation and 
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 214 (2014) (highlighting the wide array of 
organizations that participate in transnational regulation). 
67  See Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack, Transnational communities and their 
impact on the governance of business and economic activity, in TRANSNATIONAL 
COMMUNITIES SHAPING GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, 377, 382–83  (Marie-Laure 
Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2015) (describing the creation of transnational 
communities). 
68  For information related to conflicts within the private sphere, see Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation? (European University 
Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 53, 
2010) at 31. 
69  See Tim Bartley & Shawna N. Smith, Communities of practice as cause and 
consequence of transnational governance: the evolution of social and environmental 
certification, in TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES SHAPING GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE 347, 350 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2010) (establishing 
that, unlike national communities, transnational communities represent a much 
wider variety of interests and objectives). 
70  See Julia Black, Legitimacy, accountability and polycentric regulation: dilemmas, 
trilemmas and organizational response, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 
241, 255 (Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin, Till Forster & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel eds., 
2009) (discussing the different views that exist as to the trade-offs between 
regulatory objectives and the choice of instrument). 
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 Private regimes address conflicts within industry, both within 
CSOs and between industry and CSOs.  Conflicts are both allocative 
and distributive.71  Allocative conflicts concern the definition of the 
level of the optimal standard, in particular its degree of strictness or 
laxness.  Distributive conflicts concern the allocation of compliance 
costs and the benefits related to the implementation of private 
standards.  More broadly, they concern the distribution of 
regulatory power within the private sphere and between private 
and public actors.72  
Interests’ heterogeneity is reflected into both the composition of 
the communities of the regulated and that of the beneficiaries.  
Communities of regulated entities are formally defined by legal 
instruments that regulate access and exit to the regime.  The primary 
tools are membership or individual contracts between regulator and 
the regulated.  The community of the regulated in membership 
based organizations has legal power to participate in the regulatory 
process and to define the agenda of the organization and its 
regulatory objectives. 
Private standards are always stricter than public ones but how 
much stricter should they be? Who has to pay the additional costs of 
stricter standards along global value chains?  Is the distribution of 
costs explicitly regulated by the standard itself?   
Very rarely the standards explicitly determine costs’ allocation 
among regulated entities.  Private regimes differ in their emphasis 
on fairness regarding costs’ distribution.  Some regimes specifically 
                                                     
71  In particular, there are conflicting views between north and south, emerging 
and mature economies, and even between newly-emerged economies, require 
balancing and the creation of multilevel structures able to accommodate such 
heterogeneity.  Private standards may increase compliance costs in order to reduce 
externalities.  The distribution of compliance costs among regulated entities located 
along global supply chains represents a major source of conflicts in transnational 
private regimes.   
72  See Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION 
OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 441–43  (2011) (discussing the 
internationalization and privatization of rulemaking); Fabrizio Cafaggi & 
Katharina Pistor, Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative Framework for Assessing the 
Distributional Effects of Regulation 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-354, 2013) (developing the normative concept of 
“regulatory capabilities,” asserting that no entity should be subjected to a 
regulatory scheme without some freedom to choose).  See also Richard B. Stewart, 
Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation and 
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 213 (2014) [hereinafter Stewart Accountability] 
(discussing how to hold authorities in international regulatory schemes 
accountable). 
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determine the amount of premiums that retailers are required to pay 
suppliers when they comply.73  Others leave parties the task of 
negotiating cost distribution on the basis of general principles, and 
some regimes do not even regulate the matter.  If the private 
regulator does not explicitly regulate cost distribution among 
regulated entities, private parties handle the issue contractually.  
The buyer defines the premium to be paid if the supplier complies 
with the standard.   Generally, there is not a premium and no cost 
reimbursement without compliance. 
Distributional conflicts are not only about pecuniary costs, as 
they also concern objectives and trade-offs.  Take the relationship 
between global private standards and innovation transfers.  Many 
private regimes regulate the transfer of innovation related to safety 
and environmental protection from MNCs to Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises (“SMEs”).   Should innovation be transferred on 
the basis of private regulation?  Should the transfer be simply 
instrumental in order to pursue the regulatory objectives, or should 
it also stimulate the growth of SMEs in the Global South?  Should, 
for example, patents be freely accessible within supply chains?  
Should suppliers pay fees to the patent’s owner?  Should fees be 
correlated to compliance with private standards so that monitoring 
costs will decrease and overall efficiency increase? 
Different views about ranking objectives and distributing costs 
and benefits exist not only within industry, but also in the world of 
non-governmental organizations.  Conflicts among CSOs concern 
the definition of objectives and how to prioritize them.  In the past, 
private regimes would conflict since some would target 
environmental protection while others would prioritize safety even 
at the expense of environment.  Protection of consumer safety at the 
expenses of the environment would generally benefit Northern 
consumers at the expense of Southern producers.  But even with 
environmental organizations, food safety organizations, and 
certifications regimes in particular, differences concerning 
regulatory objectives and priorities are and today were in the past 
                                                     
73  Premiums incorporate the additional costs of compliance and part of the 
benefits derived therefrom.  See, for example, the structure of premiums designed 
by Fair Trade labeling organization (“FLO”), where the premium associated with 
the compliance with requirements is defined in FLO STANDARDS UNIT, Standard 
Operating Procedure: Development of Fair Trade Minimum Prices and Premiums 9 (2014), 
available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/ 
2009/standards/documents/2014-03-13_SOP_Development_of_Fairtrade_ 
Minimum_Prices_and_Premiums.pdf. 
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even more significant.74  Things are partly changing.  There is a 
growing trend towards the integration of standards within 
sustainability, attempting to reach a compromise between 
conflicting objectives, especially in multi-stakeholder organizations.  
However, some divergences still persist.  
A variety of institutional responses to conflicting views and 
objectives has been provided.  The first response to conflicts is 
provided by governance models.75  There is an increasing use of 
                                                     
74  See Christine Overdevest, Comparing forest certification schemes: the case of 
ratcheting standards in the forest sector, 8 SOCIO- ECONOMIC REVIEW 47, 2010; Graeme 
Auld, CONSTRUCTING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, 5 (2014). 
75 In many instances, CSO-driven regimes take multi-stakeholder forms in order to 
accommodate diverging views and objectives, as for example in food safety, where 
they include farmers, processors, retailers, and environmental and consumer 
protection organizations.  See, for example, the Roundtable of Sustainable Biofuels, 
where there are seven chambers representing different interests.  According to 
Article 4 of the Charter the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials Association, 
there are seven chambers:  
1.  Biomass producers (e.g. farmers, plantation managers and other 
feedstock growers); 
2.  Industrial biomaterial/bioenergy producers; 
3.  Retailers/blenders, transportation industry, users of biomaterials and 
banks/investors; 
4.  Rights-based NGOs (including land, water, human, and labor rights) 
and trade unions; 
5.  Rural development, food security, smallholder farmers, indigenous 
people, and community-based civil society organizations; 
6.  Environment, or conservation organizations and climate change, or 
policy organizations; 
7.    Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), governments, 
research/academic institutions, standard-setters, specialist advisory 
agencies, certification agencies, and consultancy organizations, as well as 
any other applicants for membership who do not fulfil the characteristics 
of any other Chamber. 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials Association, Articles of Association, 
Version 23 September 2014, Art. 4 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2015), available at 
www.rsb.org. 
See Round Table on Responsible Soy Association, Statutes, Art. 4 (accessed June 
28, 2015), available at http://www.responsiblesoy.org/documentos/ statutes-
bylaws/?lang=en, where there are three constituencies: 
“1. Producers, 
 2.  Industry, Trade and Finance 
(excluding producers, including supply chain actors such 
as crushers, traders, food and feed manufacturers and 
financial institutions), 
3. Civil society organizations.” 
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multi-stakeholder regulatory models, which includes both a simple 
and a complex version.  In the simple version, the organization 
opens the membership to different constituencies.76  In some cases, 
the regulatory model prioritizes constituencies by using different 
membership statuses.  The main constituency is granted full 
membership, while other constituencies are given the status of 
associate members—or that of observers.  The complex model is 
composed of different chambers, or pillars, within the general 
assembly.  Each constituency is represented in a chamber, and the 
chambers appoint members of the board.77  The multi-chamber 
models represent a more sophisticated approach used when there is 
                                                     
See Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil, Background, (last accessed Jan. 15, 
2015), available at http://www.sustainablepalmoil.org/standards-certfication/ 
certification-schemes/the-roundtable-on-sustainable-palm-oil-rspo/,where there 
are seven sectors:  
“1. Banks and investors 
  2. Consumer goods manufacturers 
  3. Environmental or nature conservation organizations (NGOs) 
  4. Oil Palm growers 
  5. Palm Oil processors and Traders 
  6. Retailers 
  7. Social or Development Organizations (NGOs).” 
76  In membership-based regimes, as is the case for associations, both access 
and exit are regulated by the law of the association. Membership is the tool that 
permits a potentially regulated entity to participate to the regulatory process and 
implies the undertaking of obligations related to the regime. Members of IATA 
have to be airlines and commit to comply with IATA standards related to safety 
and the circulation of dangerous goods. . . Members of FSC . . . members of ISDA, 
members of GFSI. 
77  This model is used by Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”), where the 
General Assembly is composed of three membership Chambers, and is the highest 
decision-making body in FSC.  The Chambers are divided on the basis of three 
different constituencies, Environmental, Social, and Economic, and are further split 
into sub-chambers countries from the Global North and Global South.  Each sub-
chamber then elects two members of the Board of Directors, which has a total of 
twelve members.  FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, Governance, https://ic.fsc.org/ 
governance.14.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).  An alternative model is that 
deployed by the International Code of Conduct for Private Service Providers 
Association, where article 3, which concerns membership, states: “Membership in 
the Association shall be divided into three membership categories reflecting 
stakeholder pillars: the Private Security Companies and Private security Service 
Providers pillar (hereinafter PSC pillar), the civil society organization (CSO) pillar 
and the government pillar.” International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_ 
Association.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
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double heterogeneity:  within and between constituencies.  For 
example, in the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) model, there 
are three chambers:  economic, social and environmental.78  Each 
chamber includes multiple organizations whose interests might not 
be perfectly aligned.  The individual chamber attempts to achieve a 
solution, which can then be negotiated with the other chambers in 
the general assembly.  
The second institutional response to the heterogeneity of 
interests is related to the changes of the regulatory process 
concerning participation and consultation.79  Many transnational 
private regulators have codified their standard setting procedures, 
which require consultations at different stages of the drafting 
process.80  In some instances, standard setting procedures have been 
adopted by private meta-regulators and then implemented by 
individual regulators in their own procedures.81  In other instances, 
they are designed by individual regulators.  Participation in the 
regulatory process by regulated entities can be accomplished in 
different ways, either individually or collectively.82  Many 
transnational private regulators create technical committees whose 
components are appointed on the basis of expertise and 
                                                     
78  Forest Stewardship Counsel, Governance, https://us.fsc.org/governance. 
181.htm (last visited June 28, 2015). 
79  See Olga Malets & Sigrid Quack, Projecting the local into the global: trajectories 
of participation in transnational standard setting, in ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGERIAL 
IDEAS: GLOBAL THEMES AND LOCAL VARIATIONS, 325, 325–338 (Drori, Hollerer , 
Walgenbach, et al. eds., 2013). 
80  ISEAL ALLIANCE, ISEAL CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE: SETTING SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS (2014) 6; see also IASB AND IFRS INTERPRETATIONS 
COMMITTEE, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK (2013), http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/ 
Documents/2013/Due_Process_Handbook_Resupply_28_Feb_2013_WEBSITE. 
pdf; ISO/IEC GUIDE 59, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR STANDARDIZATION (1994), 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:guide:59:ed-1:v1:en; UTZ CERTIFIED, 
CODE DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURE FOR A UTZ CERTIFIED PRODUCT CODE (2011), 
https://utzcertified.org/attachments/article/1987/Code%20Development%20Pr
ocedure%20UTZ%20CERTIFIED.pdf; EUROPEAN ADVERTISING STANDARDS 
ALLIANCE, DRAFT EASA BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATION (2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/ 
organisations/epc_annex2b_en.pdf; FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL, Standard 
Operating Procedure Development of  Fairtrade Standards (2012), http://www. 
fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2012-
02-07_SOP_Development_Fairtrade_ Standards.pdf.  
81  On meta private regulation, see Fabrizio Cafaggi, Regulating Private 
Regulators, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (S. Cassese 
ed.), forthcoming, 2015 (on file with the author). 
82  See Cassese, GLOBAL POLITY, supra note 61. 
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representation of interests.83  They often represent interests and 
constituencies outside those who have been granted membership. 
In technical committees, consensus is the general rule; therefore 
participation influences the final outcome of the decision making 
process.84  The alternative or complementary method to ensure 
inclusiveness is granting consultations at every relevant drafting 
stage.  The outcomes of consultations have to be taken into account 
and reasons have to be given when recommendations are rejected.  
Governance models and the integration of standards constitute 
complementary responses to the heterogeneity of various interests 
in transnational private regulation.  
 
4. THE PROCEDURAL FEATURES OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE 
REGULATION 
 
4.1. Standard Setting.  
 
TPRs are rather formalized; the regimes adopt written standards 
according to predefined procedures subject to periodical revision.  
This is a significant difference compared to customary law.85  They 
act as private legislatures and increasingly define rules on how the 
regime should be governed, including standard setting, monitoring, 
and implementing enforcement procedures.86  At times these 
procedures are defined by the charters and bylaws of the 
organization, but most times they are separate standards whose 
development is characterized by rules open to consultation with 
external stakeholders.  Such a divide marks the separation between 
the governance of the organization and governance of the 
                                                     
83  See for example GFSI, ISEAL, IFRS. 
84  See Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: 
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108:2 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 214, 235 
(2014) (distinguishing between decisional and non-decisional participation 
depending on how the right to participate can influence the final decision and in 
particular the content of the standard). 
85  See infra. 
86  See Colin Scott, Standard-setting in Regulatory Regimes, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON REGULATION, 104, 104 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge 
eds., 2010) (elaborating on the standards within regulatory regimes and “the 
challenges of a accountability associated with the emergence of a highly diffuse 
‘industry’ for regulatory standard setting”). 
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regulatory process.  The two are connected, albeit not overlapping.87  
The development of a separate body of rules concerning the 
participation in the process underlines the distinction from pure 
self-regulatory regimes where openness and inclusiveness have not 
been the primary concerns. 
Private standards are voluntary, and regulatory regimes 
frequently use market mechanisms to promote their diffusion and 
to ensure effective implementation.88  They are generally legally 
binding, although their effectiveness is additionally ensured 
through non-legal mechanisms.89  Codes of conduct, regulatory 
contracts, rule-books and agreements represent the primary 
instruments to design and to implement standards.  Auditing and 
reporting constitute the most significant techniques to assess 
compliance;90 they ensure the flow of information from the 
organization towards the community of the regulated, the potential 
beneficiaries, and the regulator.91  The paradigmatic example is 
certification where different schemes have emerged, driven by CSOs 
or by industry, and more recently by multiple stakeholders, 
including national governments.92  
It is worth examining some of the procedural features of 
transnational regulation in more detail, beginning from the process 
                                                     
87  See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi, A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Private 
Regulation: Legitimacy, Quality, Effectiveness and Enforcement (Hague Inst. for the 
Internationalisation of Law) (Preliminary Draft June, 2014) (on file with author) 
(discussing the relationship between organizational governance and regulatory 
processes). 
88  See Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 65 at 354. 
89  See Tim Buthe & Walter Mattli, International Standards and Standard-setting 
Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 440, 441 – 43 (David 
Coen, et. al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Buthe & Mattli] (identifying five reasons for 
compliance with “voluntary” standards: superior solutions to technical problems, 
network externalities, information asymmetries, social pressure or political legal 
incentives, legal sanctions). 
90  See generally Neil Gunningham, Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 120 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin 
Lodge eds., 2010) (examining how to create an enforcement strategy that achieves 
effective and efficient policy outcomes while also maintaining community 
confidence). 
91  See ISEAL Code of Practice 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.4 ICOC articles of association 
article 12, available at www.isealalliance.org (assuring compliance with social and 
environmental standards). 
92  Certification is highly relevant in some sectors, such as environment, 
product safety, while it plays only a minor role in other areas like finance. T. Bartley, 
Certification as a Mode of Regulation, Handbook on the Politics of Regulation 441 
(D. Levi Faure ed. 2011).   
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of codification concerning standard setting.93  In the past, many 
private regulators did not have rules defining standard setting 
procedures.  Charters and bylaws regulated their activity without 
any reference to the interests of stakeholders lacking membership.  
Private regulators would operate with ad hoc procedures to enact 
codes of conduct or guidelines related to the activities of their 
regulated entities.  Such systems have been subject to serious 
criticisms by external stakeholders and even by those members not 
involved in the process.94  States and international organizations 
recommended the definition of clear rules concerning the regulatory 
process for the purpose of integrating them into their legal orders.95   
More recently, private regulators have come to adopt standard 
setting procedures to which different bodies involved in the 
regulatory activity must comply with, including dispute 
settlement.96  The objective is to make the drafting process 
transparent, subject to review and contestation in order to increase 
its legitimacy (both input and output).  The effects of increasing 
proceduralization of the regulatory process are manifold.  Clearly 
they enhance legitimacy and transparency, but at the same time 
increase both costs and time.  Standard setting rules include periodic 
revision and integration.  The obligation to revise codes and 
standards after a relatively short period of time ensures the pace of 
regulatory innovation without crystallizing the standards. 
In some instances, the standard setting procedures deployed by 
individual regulators follow templates produced by meta private 
regulators.97  A case in point is that of the members of International 
social and environmental accreditation and labeling (ISEAL) 
alliance.  ISEAL is a non-profit company incorporated in the UK and 
encompasses a number of organizations in the field of 
                                                     
93  See Buthe & Mattli, supra note 89, at 441. 
94  See Stewart Accountability, supra note 72, at 234 (contending that the 
accountability deficit of global regimes can be corrected by reforming some of the 
current accountability mechanisms). 
95  This has often been the case for the European Union that has stimulated a 
more accountable definition of the regulatory process.  
96  See, e.g., ISO-IEC Directives part 2, 2014 available at www.iso.org.  Due 
process handbook of IASB,  available at www.ifrs.org., EASA Recommendation on 
code drafting and consultation available at www.EASA.org., ISEAL standard setting 
code available at www.isealalliance.org. 
97  See, e.g., ISO Guides for Standardization Drafted in Compliance with the 
WTO Code of Practice ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 and ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994. 
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sustainability.98  It produces meta-rules to be applied to the 
members.99  ISEAL has published three codes, one related to 
standard setting, one on impact (monitoring) and one on assurance 
(compliance and enforcement).100  Compliance with the codes is 
mandatory for full members.  The standard setting codes defines 
procedures that members have to follow when enacting their own 
codes.101  These rules concern (1) the criteria for participation in the 
process (mapping stakeholders, selecting the relevant actors 
according to a balance of different interests),102 (2) the drafting 
criteria, (3) the process of consultation that has to be repeated after 
each stage, and (4) the process of revision that has to take place 
periodically.103 
Both in the case of meta-regulation and that of individual 
regulators, one challenge is to accommodate heterogeneity in the 
community of regulated entities.  Private regulators aim at 
regulating thousands or even millions of firms across the globe.  
Differences related to size, managerial and financial capabilities, 
and business cultures may be dramatic.  A regulatory strategy that 
fits for every possible regulated entity does not exist.  There is need 
to differentiate according to departure points and developmental 
                                                     
98   ISEAL Alliance, www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
99  Meta-rules are framing principles that individual regulators implement in 
their own regulatory instruments.  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Transnational Private 
Regulation: Regulating Private Regulators, cit. fn. 81, p. 18-19. 
100  ISEAL Alliance, www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
101  See ISEAL Alliance, Standard Development Point 5.1 Terms of Reference, 
www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (stating that standard 
developments have to follow the terms of reference which must include: a 
justification for the new standard, a clear definition of the objectives the standard 
intends achieving, “an assessment of risks in implementing the standard and how 
to mitigate for these, including identification of factors that could have a negative 
impact on the ability of the standard to achieve its objectives, the identification of 
unintended consequences, and possible corrective actions to address these 
consequences.”) 
102  See ISEAL Alliance, Standard Development Point 5.5.1 Terms of Reference, 
www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (requiring that “standard setting 
organizations shall ensure that participation in standard consultation is open to all 
interested parties and that participation and decision making reflects a balance of 
interests among interested parties in the subject matter and in the geographic scope 
in which the standard applies.”) 
103  See, e.g., UTZ Certified Code Development Procedure 2.0 September 2014, 
www.utzcertified.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (enacting compliance with ISEAL 
code of good practice for setting social and environmental standards). 
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capabilities of each (cluster of) regulated entities.104  The regulatory 
approach is changing:  many organizations now define timelines 
that permit firms with different sizes and capabilities to reach the 
stage of full compliance over time through a process of “continuous 
improvement.”105  
 
4.2. Review and Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
Enforcement is a key pillar of every regulatory system.  In TPR 
enforcement mechanisms operate to ensure compliance with the 
standards and solve disputes between regulator and regulated, 
between regulated, and between regulated and third parties.106  
Sometimes enforcement is partly decentered and the regulator 
imposes the adoption of grievance mechanisms on each regulated 
entity to solve disputes with third parties.107  
Some regimes are still limited to standard setting and do not 
provide any dispute resolution mechanisms, relying on domestic 
courts or on generic enforcement private systems such as 
arbitration.108  Dispute resolution bodies in transnational private 
                                                     
104  See,  e.g., UTZ Core Code of Conduct 1.0, 2014, www.utzcertified.org (last 
accessed Jan. 15, 2015) (highlighting the 4 year used by UTZ certified in their Core 
Code of Conduct distinguishing between mandatory and additional control points. 
The total amount is always 120 but the first year the ratio is 60/60, the second is 
87/33, the third is 103/17, the fourth is 113/7).   
105  Typically this is true for SMEs, compared to large enterprises when the 
same standard applies, but the time to achieve full compliance differs.  In other 
contexts, regulators have designed different standards introducing distinctions 
among regulated entities.  
106  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: Models 
and Patterns, in Fabrizzio Cafaggi (ed.) Enforcement of Transnational Regulation, 
Ensuring Compliance in a Global World, 2012, 75 ff. 99 [hereinafter Enforcing 
Transnational Private Regulation]. 
107  In the field of private securities, see art. 13 International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Providers, ICOC, and in the field of data protection, binding 
corporate rules usually include legal enforceability of rules by the so-called 
controller. See Art. 29 Data Protection WP, Explanatory Document on the Processor 
Binding Corporate Rules, 10 (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp204_en.pdf. 
108  2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, available at  www.isda.org (explaining the 
paradigmatic case of ISDA where the master agreement (section 13 b) indicated as 
default clause the jurisdiction of English Courts.  In 2013 a policy change occurred 
and ISDA suggested the introduction of arbitration agreements).     
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regimes are more common in membership-based organizations, 
including trading platforms.109   
Recently, dispute settlement bodies have been created 
separately from the standard setters to preserve their independence, 
impartiality, and autonomy and to reduce conflicts of interest.110  
Their degree of independence and compliance with due process 
varies across fields.111  The private enforcer might be a unit of the 
regulatory body or have independent legal personality but its 
activity should not be subject to the control of the standard setter.  
Parallel to the creation of independent enforcers has been the 
codification of rules.  Individual regulators have expressly codified 
principles about regulatory enforcement; accordingly enforcement 
procedures have to be accessible and fair, the enforcer has to be 
independent and impartial, and must provide injured parties with 
effective remedies.112  Compared to the contemporary ‘merchant 
courts,’ a much higher degree of proceduralization and a lower 
degree of discretion is warranted in this type of private 
adjudication.113  
                                                     
109  The creation of an enforcement body should not be interpreted as it has 
been the case for lex mercatoria as an attempt to insulate these regimes from the 
control of domestic courts that continue to play a significant role. 
110  The most well-known example is the TAS (Sport Arbitral Tribunal) 
reformed to comply with a judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court that 
required separation and independence from the standard setting body (Swiss 
Federal Tribunal, Gundel v. Fédération Equestre International, 15 March 1993, BGE 
119 II271). See L. Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportive by the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport, Ger. L. J.  1317 ff. at 1322 (2011).  In the field of advertising see EASA Best 
practice recommendation on jury composition available at www.easa.org., applied 
to national SROs regulating advertising. See P. Verbruggen, Enforcing 
Transnational Private Regulation, EE, 2014.    
111  See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation, 
supra note 106 at 77. 
112  See, e.g., art. 13.1 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers, ICOC. The importance of a fair and impartial grievance mechanisms is 
also emphasized by the ‘Ruggie’ principles concerning CSR.  See United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, Principle 31 (2011) available at www.un.org (casting the criteria for 
effective non-judicial grievance mechanisms). 
113  Even if the enforcement body is composed by experts with specific 
knowledge of the sector, impartiality and due process have become necessary 
conditions for legitimacy. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/2
CAFAGGI 9/24/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RULE-MAKING 905 
The third party enforcer just described has not entirely replaced 
other models, in particular that of first party enforcement.114  In 
many instances the scheme owner maintains the right to directly 
administer sanctions when regulated entities violate the rules.  This 
is the case in electronic trade platforms, in certification schemes, in 
several roundtables to name a few.115  In the latter examples the 
standard setter and the enforcer coincide, and there is no 
independence. 
Proceduralization of enforcement includes the definition of a 
sanctioning system.  Enforcement by private regulators is based on 
a tripartite set of sanctions:  those stemming from contract law, those 
based on organizational law, and those grounded on reputation.  
Legal sanctions, often defined by the codes of conduct, are generally 
combined with extra-legal sanctions.116  Legal sanctions are often 
based on membership and strongly related to reputational effects in 
the market place.117  Clearly conventional sanctions for breach of 
contract are rarely used.  Purely reputational mechanisms on the 
other hand would not suffice to protect the interests of those who 
suffer harms from regulated entities’ violations.  Much more 
common is the combined use of corrective measures and the power 
of exclusion on the basis of an escalating mechanism.118  
                                                     
114  See Dixit, supra note 21, at 10 (using Avinash Dixit taxonomy, one should 
conclude that first, second and third party enforcement institutions co-exist in 
transnational private regulation). 
115  See GLOBALG.A.P., GENERAL REGULATIONS: PART I; GENERAL RULES, art. 6.6 
(Part I 4.0-1, 2012) (art. 8 and 15) (concerning the power of GLOBALG.A.P. to sanction 
certification bodies), Roundtable for responsible soy where the executive board has the 
power to admit and exclude members (art. 8 and 15).   
116  The creation of blacklists that forbids engaging in trading relationships or 
expulsion from the regime may have severe economic repercussions, being often 
much more effective than damages. 
117  Enforcement mechanisms vary depending on whether the regulator is 
membership based.  In this instance, the regulator has a right to exclude or suspend 
membership depending on the seriousness of the violation.  Often loosing 
membership can have blaming and shaming effects much stronger than common 
contractual sanctions. 
118  On the use of right of exclusion as a governance mechanism, see Henry E. 
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 
No. S2 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).  On the use of complementary enforcement 
mechanisms, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal 
Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, eds., Kluwer 2004); 
Avinash K. Dixit, LAWLESNESS AND ECONOMICS (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE, 97 ff. 
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A clear illustration of an institutionalized community, using 
both reputational and legal sanctions, is provided by some 
contemporary e-commerce platforms where the reputational 
sanctions are determined by peers on the basis of the platform 
regulation.119  In addition, the platform owner can use legal 
sanctions primarily directed at preventing wrongful conduct by 
traders that may result in the suspension or termination of an 
individual account.120    
                                                     
119  For instance, in the case of eBay, after each transaction on the auction 
platform, parties are asked to leave an evaluation of the negotiation partner, namely 
a Feedback:  buyers can leave a positive, negative, or a neutral rating, plus a short 
comment, whereas sellers can leave a positive rating and a short comment.  The 
ratings provided by each user build up the so-called Feedback scores, where 
members receive one additional point for each positive rating, no points for each 
neutral rating, and reduce one point for each negative rating.  This allows the other 
users to verify the trustworthiness of the buyer or seller within the platform.  Since 
20th August 2014, the eBay system added a new measure for sellers’ evaluation:  
the transaction defect rate.  This provides information regarding the seller’s 
successful transactions that have one or more transaction-related defects.  Ebay sets 
a minimum standard for this rate: sellers can have up to a maximum 5% of 
transactions with one or more transaction defects over the most recent evaluation 
period.  A maximum 2% will allow a seller to qualify as an eBay ‘Top Rated Seller.’  
It is not clear what exactly happens when this requirement is not met.  The website 
only affirms that “eBay regularly offers coaching and training to sellers in order to 
help them be more successful.  Sellers who fall below standard can expect to receive 
clear notification of next steps and actions.  Consequences of falling below the 
minimum performance standards can include lowered search standing, limits to 
further selling, and in some cases a permanent loss of selling privileges.” 2014 
Spring Seller Update: Updates to Seller Standards Designed to Reward Great Service with 
More Sales, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/news/ 
springupdate2014/sellerstandards.html#highlights (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).  In 
cases of negotiation problems, eBay’s internal negotiation platform can resolve 
problems: “If the buyer and seller can’t come to an agreement, eBay may decide the 
case. eBay may issue a refund, reverse a sale, or require the buyer to pay for an 
item.”  Contacting Customer Service, eBay.com, http://pages.ebay.com.sg/eBP/ 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2015).  Finally, if suspicious activity is reported, the eBay Trust 
and Safety team investigates the situation.  If a member violates a policy, the process 
is warning, limitation and then suspension of the account privileges.  Knowing the 
Rules for Sellers, eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/policies.html (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2015). 
120  See, e.g., eBay User Agreement, eBay.com, http://pages.ebay.com/help/ 
policies/user-agreement.html, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/role-               
of-eBay.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (”If we believe you are abusing eBay in any 
way, we may, in our sole discretion and without limiting other remedies, limit, 
suspend, or terminate your user account(s) and access to our Services, delay or 
remove hosted content, remove any special status associated with your account(s), 
remove and demote listings, reduce or eliminate any discounts, and take technical 
and/or legal steps to prevent you from using our Services..”). 
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The boundaries between compliance monitoring and 
enforcement are not always clear-cut in transnational private 
regulation.121  On the one hand, the notion of enforcement is broader 
than that adopted in the public sphere, including different 
sanctioning systems that deploy legal and non-legal sanctions.  On 
the other hand, the distinction between ex ante oversight and ex post 
punishment has blurred.  In some instances a complex multi-tool 
strategy has been designed.  For example, in the Articles of the 
Association of Private Services Companies International Code of 
Conduct (ICOC), three systems must simultaneously be in place:  
certification (art. 10), reporting, monitoring, and assessing the 
company’s performance (art. 11), and the complaints process (art. 
12).122  In other instances, auditing and reporting are the primary 
mechanisms to ensure compliance.123  
Auditing and reporting constitute only part of the wide array of 
instruments deployed by private regulators.124  Self-assessment tools 
are now provided to individual firms in order to allow them to 
assess and report on their regulatory performance.125  The outcomes 
of self-assessment can be subject to evaluation by committees and be 
discussed by the community of regulated and affected stakeholders.  
Different forms of peer reviews are deployed to promote mutual 
learning between regulated entities participating in the same 
regime.  They often take the network form in order to ensure 
adequate interactions among participants.126 
Conflicts concern not only the application but also the validity 
of rules.  Many regimes define internal review procedures where 
                                                     
121  Especially in certification regimes, the power to monitor compliance with 
certification schemes and the power to issue sanctions for noncompliance are not 
well differentiated.  The certification body has to monitor compliance and can 
suspend or terminate certification as a punishment for noncompliance.  See, e.g., 
GLOBALG.A.P., supra note 115, at art. 6. 
122  See Swiss Confederation, International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers, ICOC (Nov. 9, 2010). 
123  This is the approach taken by ISEAL in its assurance code. ISEAL Alliance, 
Assuring Compliance with Social and Environmental Standards: Code of Good 
Practice (2012), available at www.isealalliance.org. 
124  See, e.g., Stewart Accountability, supra note 94, at 252 (listing transparency, 
peer reputational influences and incentives, and competition as some of the more 
broadly defined methods of accountability). 
125  See CAFAGGI & RENDA, supra note 9, at 99; Stewart Accountability, supra 
note 94, at 211. 
126  See Timothy D. Lytton & Lesley K. McAllister, Oversight in Private Food 
Safety Auditing: Addressing Auditors Conflict of Interest, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 289, 330-331 
(2014) (describing the network structure of institutional oversight). 
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affected stakeholders may seek standards’ review before specialized 
committees or independent bodies.127  These mechanisms are 
primarily directed toward parties who are not members and have 
not been able to actively participate in standard setting activities.  
Internal review is separated from complaints handling and often 
dealt with by a different committee.  Review is also performed by 
domestic courts that contribute to regulatory innovation.128  The use 
of domestic courts to adjudicate disputes related to the 
implementation of transnational regulation may come at a cost.  
Decentralized review procedures may cause inconsistencies when 
different laws are applicable to the same transnational regime.129  
The link between internal and external review process is still rather 
weak.  Enforcement and review mechanisms have become more 
relevant in global private regulatory regimes.  They provide a 
centralized mechanism deploying a wide menu of sanctions that 
complement decentralized enforcement by domestic courts and 
arbitrators. 
 
4.3.  Separation of Functions in the Regulatory Process 
 
The evolution of the last twenty years suggests that 
transnational private governance has moved toward separation of 
functions.  The private regulatory process is now structured 
similarly to the conventional public process, separating the various 
                                                     
127  See, e.g., Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, art. 
IV, ICANN (July 30, 2014), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-
2012-02-25-en?routing_type=path (describing three alternative mechanisms [board 
reconsideration committee, independent review panel, ICANN ombudsman] in the 
field of internet domains); Swiss Confederation, International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Provers’ Association: Articles of Association, art. 13.2.3, ICoC, 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2015) (describing procedures in the field of private security 
companies, where the Secretariat reviews complaints regarding grievance 
procedures).    
128  Two examples are provided by the English and New York Courts in the 
adaptation of the ISDA Master agreement and the role of the Federal Swiss 
Supreme Tribunal in relation to International Olympic committee.  INTERNATIONAL 
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (2002), 
available at www.isda.orghttp://www.isda.org/publications/isdamasteragrmnt. 
aspx#ma. 
129  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: Models and 
Patterns, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE 
IN A GLOBAL WORLD (Edward Elgar ed., 2012) at 92. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss4/2
CAFAGGI 9/24/2015  4:04 PM 
2015] TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RULE-MAKING 909 
functions:  standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement.  In the 
simpler version, this separation has occurred within the same 
organization by creating differentiated committees to ensure that no 
conflicts of interest arise.  In more complex architectures, separation 
of functions has spurred the creation of independent units, 
sometimes with their own legal personality.  This development, 
driven by the need for higher accountability, has departed from the 
more conventional private model of the merchant courts where the 
same community, often the same individuals, set the rules and solve 
conflicts concerning their application.  Multi-stakeholder 
organizations tend to have a higher degree of functional separation 
between standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement. 
 
5. REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS 
 
A third distinct feature of TPR is represented by the specificity 
of regulatory instruments.  TPRs define voluntary standards to be 
applied by regulated entities, individually or collectively, for the 
benefit of third parties, e.g. the regulatory beneficiaries (consumers, 
investors, human rights holders, environmental groups).  These 
standards are collected or codified in codes, rulebooks, guidelines, 
or principles.130   
Standards can define how regulated entities should ensure a 
certain level of product safety or prohibit social practices that imply 
the use of child labor, slavery, and discrimination.  They may either 
(1) proscribe the standards and let regulated entities choose the 
implementation instruments (output standards), or (2) suggest or 
impose not only the tool (the standard contract form) firms have to 
deploy, but also the governance requirements necessary for good 
implementation (input standards).131  In this matter there is a wide 
variety of standards ranging from general principles to highly 
detailed and specific rules. 
                                                     
130  See, e.g., Equator Principles, supra note 8; International Bar Association, 
Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession (2011); ISEAL Credibility Principles, 
supra note 31; World Diamond Council, System of Warranties (2014), 
https://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Syst
em%20of%20Warranties%20WDC%202014.pdf; International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Providers, supra at note 128; Unaccompanied Standards, IFRS (Jan. 1, 
2014), http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Pages/IFRS.aspx#1 (accounting standards). 
131  For example they can impose the adoption of HACCP for product safety 
and a specific safety management scheme to implement it.  
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Contracts are also an important element in the regulatory toolkit.  
Standard contracts and standard terms constitute conventional 
instruments to regulate cross-border exchanges whose scope and 
functions have recently been broadened to incorporate regulatory 
objectives.132  They are deployed (1) to regulate the relationship 
between regulator and regulated, (2) to implement standards in the 
relationship between regulated and third parties (sale or 
distribution contracts), and (3) to monitor standards’ compliance 
(certification contract).  
Regulatory contracts are used to create and regulate new 
markets.  In addition to the traditional activities related to the 
collection of standard forms and term of the International Chamber 
of commerce (ICC), new markets have been created by private 
regulators ranging from electronic trading platforms to financial 
over the counter (OTC) infrastructures.  New technologies and 
financial innovation have spurred new trading platforms with 
participants coming from different jurisdictions.133  While creating 
new markets or implementing regulatory policies, private 
regulators design master agreements, framework contracts, and 
standard contract forms that participants are recommended to use 
when engaging in trade.134  For example, the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreement represents a 
powerful regulatory tool to regulate derivatives’ transactions.135  The 
ISDA master agreement is incorporated in the individual contracts, 
which cover a number of transactions.  Other examples of 
contractual standardization directed at marked design concern data 
protection, e-commerce, and product certification.136   
                                                     
132  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Contracts: 
New Architecture, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1557 (2013) [hereinafter New Architecture] 
(exploring the increasing interaction between transnational contracting, 
transnational regulation, and certification). 
133  These markets are primarily regulated by private actors with some degree 
of public intervention by domestic legislation and by trans-governmental networks. 
134  Competition and antitrust authorities have banned the practice of private 
regulators imposing contractual forms or terms on regimes’ participants.  In Europe 
this prohibition has been applied directly to banking contracts.   
135  The ISDA Master Agreement (MA) specifies that the MA and the 
confirmation statements are part of the same agreement and reflects the interests of 
all ISDA members, ensuring the diffusion of the regulatory instrument and 
consequently the development of the market.  INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (2002) available at 
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdamasteragrmnt.aspx#ma. 
136  On the ISDA Master agreement, see DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL 
DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 
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Regulating markets often implies the definition of 
boilerplates.137  Contracts’ standardization performs important 
regulatory functions, particularly when there is strong 
interdependencies among the transactions taking place within a 
single market:  e.g. prices and quantities of each transaction 
influence the prices and quantities of other transactions, contractual 
termination may affect prices of other contracts and induce other 
defaults.  Contract standardization also plays a strategic function in 
generating network externalities.138  New participants have an 
incentive to adopt the ISDA master agreement if that is already used 
by the majority of traders in that market.  
The regulatory function of contracts has in turn had an impact 
on the sanctioning system.  Compliance with private standards, 
incorporated in the commercial contract, is ensured by a double 
system of sanctions.139  Contractual sanctions are sought by the 
buyer against the seller, while regulatory sanctions are administered 
by the private regulator to the party responsible for compliance.  The 
latter may refer to whichever contractual party subscribes to the 
regulatory regime. 
                                                     
163 (Wiley, 2010); Joanne Braithwaite, Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: 
Evidence From the Derivatives Markets, 75(5) M.L.R. 779 (2012); J. Biggins and C. Scott, 
Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State 
and OTC Derivatives Market Reform (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law 
Review 307, p. 324; P. Saguato, in THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 32 (2013). In the field of certification licensing, standard 
contract forms regulating the relationship between the accrediting body and the 
certifier and the certifier and the certified are a constant feature of each regime.  See 
GLOBALG.A.P., supra note 121; IFOAM.  In the field of ecommerce, all the 
electronic platforms define general principles in codes or principles and then issue 
standard contracts forms that trader have to use. 
137  See S. CHOI AND MITU GULATI, Contract as Statute in O. BEN- SHAHAR, 
BOILERPLATE 145, 149 (2006). See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 
in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 145, 149 (Omri Ben-
Shahar, ed., 2007). 
138  See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract As Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1129 (2005-2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation 
of Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) 
(analyzing how externalities influence standardization, customization, and 
innovation in corporate contracts). See Mitu Gulati & Stephen J. Choi, Contract As 
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation of Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) (analyzing how externalities influence 
standardization, customization, and innovation in corporate contracts). 
139  See New Architecture, supra note 1372, at 1600. 
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 Implementation of private standards can involve groups of 
regulated entities.  In these instances, the regulated entities are 
recommended to use multiparty and regulatory contracts to 
establish a network that has to implement regulatory requirements.  
Such networks can be (1) vertical, including parties along the global 
supply chain aimed at implementing safety, environmental, or 
social policies, or (2) horizontal among firms in different supply 
chains located in the same geographic location.140  The use of 
contracts imposes monitoring costs on the parties along the chain to 
evaluate compliance and react in case of non-compliance through 
innovative sanctioning regimes. 
To ensure compliance, many regulatory instruments use market 
driven tools, including both prices and sanctions.  They reward 
compliance via market prices and punish violations by using 
reputational and community sanctions, in addition to the more 
conventional contractual and associational sanctions.141  Possibly the 
most interesting developments concern compliance instruments; for 
example, how regulated entities’ compliance is ensured using both 
hierarchical and peer monitoring.142   
Regulatory instruments do not focus only on standard setting 
and implementation.  Compliance monitoring has stimulated the 
development of many innovative regulatory instruments. 
Furthermore, it refers to the regulator and to those that have to 
comply. Private standards concern also reporting and monitoring 
                                                     
140  Horizontal networks can be created to access capital (multiparty loans), 
technologies (patent pools), and knowledge (multiparty contracts to transfer know-
how).  
141  Dixit, supra note 118, at 97. 
142  See NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES 120 
(Oxford Handbook of Regulation, 2010). See generally CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE 
LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE:  BUSINESS RESPONSES TO 
REGULATION (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011); FABRIZIO 
CAFAGGI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 108 (Edward Elgar ed., 
2012); PAUL VERBRUGGEN, ENFORCING TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING AND FOOD SAFETY (Edward Elgar ed., 2014); 
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
(Wolters Kluwer 1st ed., 2014). See NEIL GUNNINGHAM, Enforcement and Compliance 
Strategies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 120 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 
2010). See generally CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING 
COMPLIANCE:  BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION (Edward Elgar ed., 2012); 
FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 108 (Edward 
Elgar ed., 2012); PAUL VERBRUGGEN, ENFORCING TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE 
REGULATION (Edward Elgar ed., 2014); GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF 
GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE (2014). 
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compliance by regulated entities.143  Firms are required to issue 
financial and non-financial reporting where they document their 
degree of compliance with human rights, social, and environmental 
policies.144  Due diligence requirements associated with compliance 
often translates into changes concerning both the internal 
governance of the corporation and that of the supply chain.145  Self-
assessment is the first - yet not the exclusive - instrument to monitor 
regulatory performance.  Private regulators use ex officio power to 
inspect and monitor regulated entities compliance, in addition they 
may deploy third party monitoring by delegating this function to 
‘independent’ private actors.146  Monitoring instruments increase 
accountability both towards the regulated along with the 
beneficiaries of the regulatory process while also providing 
information about overall effectiveness. 
 
6. USAGES, CUSTOM, AND JURA MERCATORUM 
 
Conventionally, the new lex mercatoria has been described as a 
body of privately set rules produced by a community of traders 
whose legitimacy is provided by the community itself.147  It is a 
                                                     
143  See, e.g., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
GUIDELINES (2013), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-
Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf. (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015). 
144  ICOC Articles of Association, supra note 91, at art. 12. 
145  See generally The Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015); FAO-OECD Guidance for Responsible Agricultural 
Supply Chains, Draft for Comment, 2015, available at http://mneguidelines. 
oecd.org/FAO-OECD-guidance-responsible-agricutural-supply-chains.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015); International Fund for Agricultural Development, Procedures 
for Financing from the Grants Programme, available at http://www.ifad.org/ 
gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-28.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
146  See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Measuring the Effectiveness 
of Private Regulatory Organizations, 82 STRIJBIS FOUND. REP. (2014), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2508684. 
147  ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 38 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2007) (“[L]ex mercatoria . . . consists of the unwritten customs and practices 
of merchants so far as satisfying externally set criteria for validation.  This definition 
excludes written codification of customs and practice . . . .  [L]ex mercatoria is thus 
best seen as being true to its origins the product of spontaneous activity on the part 
of merchants.”). 
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contested concept.148  Among the most debated issues are the self-
contained nature of lex mercatoria and its independence from state 
laws.  Recently, both the assumption of statelessness and that of 
centralization of rulemaking and uniformity have been successfully 
challenged.149  Both historians and lawyers have shown that lex 
mercatoria emerges out of an institutional framework where 
adjudication plays a paramount role.150  Moreover, merchant rules 
have been for the most part local and often conflicting, rather than 
uniform and universal.151  
The concept of custom (consuetudo) is at the same time broader 
and narrower than jus mercatorum.152  Through custom, social 
                                                     
      148  See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria:  
History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169 
(2008) (detailing the analysis of lex mercatoria’s rival accounts). 
149  Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria:  Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447–68 (2007); Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State 
Governance, 1 UTAH L. REV. 31, 31–45 (2010); THE AMES FOUNDATION, LEX 
MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM:  A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS 
AFTERLIFE (Mary Elizabeth Basil et al. eds., 1998) available at 
http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/lm.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); J. 
Donahue, ‘Benvenuto Stracca’s De mercatura:  Was There a lex mercatoria in Sixteenth 
Century Italy?’, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW, COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
IN CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24, 69–120 Ralf Michaels, 
The True Lex Mercatoria:  Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 
447–68 (2007); Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 1 UTAH L. REV. 31, 
31–45 (2010); Mary E. Basile et. al., LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM:  A LATE 
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (1998); Charles Donahue, 
‘Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura:  Was There a Lex mercatoria in Sixteenth Century 
Italy?’, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW, COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN 
CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24, 69–120 (Vito Piergiovanni 
ed., 2005) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE STUDIES]. 
150  The role of adjudication is very relevant to identifying the existence of a 
custom and determining its content and effects.  While it is universally recognized 
that adjudication by courts and arbitrators is relevant, different views exist on the 
effects of judicial “recognition” of custom.  Some believe that it is a precondition for 
making the custom binding; others hold the view that it has only a declaratory 
function.  See generally Roy Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational 
Commercial Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 7–18 (1997); ALBRECHT CORDES, The Search 
for Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 5 OXFORD U. COMP. L F., 64 (2003), http://ouclf.iuscomp. 
org/articles/cordes.shtml. 
151  See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
1153, 1153 (2012) [hereinafter The Myth] (providing an account of commonly 
conflicting rules). 
152  See J.  Gilissen, Consuetudine, in DIGESTO, DISC. PRIVATISTICHE 9 (UTET, 1988) 
9 [hereinafter Gilissen, Consuetudine]; NORBERTO BOBBIO, LA CONSUETUDINE COME 
FATTO NORMATIVO (pincite) (1942) (parenthetical); Norberto Bobbio, Consuetudine 
(teoria generale), in 9 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 426 (Antonino Giuffre ed., 1961).  For 
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practices in commercial and social relationships become legally 
binding.153  Customary rules have contributed to the creation of new 
markets or to their globalization, as for example the financial 
instruments like bills of exchange and bills of lading introduced by 
Italian bankers and merchants in the fifteenth century.154  Custom is 
broader because it is not limited to merchants and to contracts and 
exchanges; it applies to other fields of private law, from property 
and intellectual property to torts and restitution.155  It concerns 
weights, measures, and other performance features (e.g. time and 
place) related to exchanges.156   Custom tends to be associated with 
specific transactions and markets.  It “regulates” the exploitation of 
resources - the limits posed in the interest of community - to the use 
of collective resources when related to ownership.157   
Jus mercatorum is broader than custom since it encompasses both 
statuta (general regulations concerning merchants and the 
relationships between merchants and third parties), consuetudo 
(custom), and the decisions by merchant courts.158 
Historically, custom was the primary source of legal regulation 
of commercial relationships in Europe until the French revolution 
and the Code de commerce of 1807, where primacy of legislation 
determined the decline of custom.  However, custom never 
disappeared after the codification process started.159   Even after the 
Ordonnance de commerce was in 1673 enacted by Colbert, the role 
of “coutumes” in French commercial law remained very 
significant.160  A different path was followed in English common 
                                                     
a historical perspective, see generally the essays in COMPARATIVE STUDIES, supra note 
149. 
153  Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 4 
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999). 
 154  See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105 (1991) (explaining 
the evolution across institutions in early modern Europe). 
155  See Geoffrey Hodgson, On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The 
Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering, 43 J. of Econ. Issues, 143 (2009). 
156  Id. 
157  See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). 
158  See FRANCESCO GALGANO, STORIA DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 38 (1976). 
159  David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
153-155 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B. Murphy eds., Cambridge U. Press 
2007). See also R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 
(1-15) (D.E.L. Johnson trans., 1988). 
160  Vito Piergiovanni, Diritto Commerciale nel Diritto Medievale e Moderno, 4 
DIGESTO 333, 343 (1989). Vito Piergiovanni, Diritto Commerciale nel Diritto Medievale 
e Moderno, in DIGESTO, 333, 343 (1989).         
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law, where the origins of common laws are often grounded on 
custom and integration rather than separation as the distinctive 
feature of the relationship between law and custom.161  At common 
law, custom and laws are seen more as complements than 
competing sources.162 
Custom develops out of usages that reflect patterns of behavior 
by members of a business community.163  Unlike “mos” (habit) which 
represents factual pattern of behavior, consuetudo (custom) 
constitutes a normative practice.164    
 In medieval times, (business) communities were closed and 
access was regulated.165  Nowadays for the purpose of custom, the 
community does not have to define strict membership 
requirements.  The process through which usages and customs 
become binding on the relevant community may differ, depending 
on whether it is self-defined by the community or regulated by the 
public authority via legislation or adjudication.   
When the community of traders defines the process through 
which rules become binding, they refer to internal rules of their 
community.  These rules range from social norms to highly 
formalized instruments.166 The public law perspective differs when 
it determines the criteria for custom to be legally binding.  In 
contemporary legal systems, custom or ‘consuetudo’ is part of legal 
sources of domestic and international regimes.167  Parties can make 
specific references to custom in their contract; custom can prevail 
over default rules whereas it cannot conflict with mandatory rules.168  
                                                     
161  See H. PATRICK GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS 16–20 (2006). 
162  Ibbetson, supra note 159, at (153). 
163  The distinction between usages and custom goes back to the school of 
Orleans and the contribution by Jacques de Revigny, 
164  See Ibbetson, supra note 159, at 156 (stating that in relation to medieval 
times, “habit represented a factual regularity while custom was normative.“). 
165  See Piergiovanni, supra note 160, at 338 (“La cittadinanza è requisito 
normalmente richiesto per appartenere alla corporazione, oltre all’esercizio 
dell’attivita’ mercantile ed alla buona fama: l’entrata viene poi sancita dal 
giuramento di accettazione delle norme sociali e dal pagamento di una tassa”). 
166  Paul R. Milgrom, et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law 
Merchant, Private Judges, and Champaign Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990). 
167  See, e.g., U.N. Commission on the International Trade Law, Digest of Case 
Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, art. 9(2), U.N. 
DOC. A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/9 (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter “CISG Art. 9”]; 
at the domestic level,  art. 12 preleggi of the Italian Civil code. 
168  Williston & Lord, supra note 153, § 34 (“At common law, the requisites for 
incorporating a custom or usage, [1] in order that it could be considered as entering 
into a contract and forming a part of it,[2] are that it must be ancient or long-
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When parties are silent, the applicability of transnational customs is 
determined according to the law of the contract.  
According to the conventional legal definition, custom 
constitutes a form of private production of rules that become 
binding when the community tacitly consents.169  The common 
features of custom are generally associated with the repetition over 
time of behavior by the majority of the community.170  Thus the two 
requirements are repetition over time of a specific behavior and 
opinio juris sive necessitatis.171  The former concerns the conduct of the 
community’s members, the latter represents the (tacit) consent of the 
relevant community to that behavior.172  The significance of the 
belief that a practice exists (opinio juris) has been relaxed in some 
areas, where simple presumed knowledge of the custom’s existence 
is considered the necessary and sufficient precondition to become 
legally binding.173  
How is the scope of custom’s application defined?  What are the 
business or social community’ boundaries to which it applies?  In 
customary law the relevant community is composed by merchants 
or traders, in agricultural law by farmers, in the professional world 
by lawyers, doctors, engineers, accountants and so on.  Unlike TPR, 
where the regulator often represents different and competing 
interests including those of stakeholders who are the primary 
beneficiaries of the standards (consumers, investors, and human 
rights holders), in custom, the community is composed by those 
who apply the rules.  Interests of the affected stakeholders outside 
of the business community are not relevant to transform the social 
                                                     
established,[3] certain,[4] continuous,[5] uniform,[6] general,[7] notorious,[8] 
reasonable,[9] and not in contravention of law.[10] Furthermore, parties acting 
within the scope of the usage's operation must acquiesce in it.[11]”). 
169  For the different perspectives with a focus on law and economics, see 
CUSTOMARY LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lisa Bernstein & Francesco Parisi, eds. 2013). 
170  See BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO, IN PRIMUM DIGESTI VETERIS PARTIS 
COMMENTARIA, Fol. 191 (1425).    
171  See Rodolfo Sacco, Consuetudine; Gilissen, Consuetudine, supra note 152, at 
para. 5 (distinguishing between an objective element [repetition over time] and a 
subjective element [belief that the rule is binding]).  
172  The consensual dimension has always been relevant to make it legally 
binding. In relation to then medieval times it has been claimed, “Just as the basis of 
legislation was the will of the prince, so the basis of custom was the will of people.” 
Ibbetson, supra note 159, at 175. 
173  See, e.g., International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT), Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010); CISG Art. 9, 
supra note 167.   
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practice into a legally binding set of rules.  Custom can produce 
externalities that are not internalized through the prescriptions of 
procedural requirements like those described in relation to TPR. 
The boundaries of what constitutes a relevant community, the 
amount of time and the frequency of repetition may vary from 
custom to custom.  The boundaries of the relevant community and 
of the scope of majoritarian consent are often left undetermined.   
Communities for whom custom is binding may be personal or 
territorial.  Consequently, customs may be personal and 
independent of a specific territory or territorial when associated 
with an administrative jurisdiction.174  Hence, there are customs 
developed by merchants, bankers, and farmers, and customs 
developed in London, Florence, Paris, Genoa, Antwerpen, Lubeck, 
and so on.  Nowadays, the primacy of legislation has reinforced the 
distinction between personal and territorial scope:  the personal 
dimension of customs versus the territorial dominance of 
legislation; hence communities producing transnational customs are 
primarily functional rather than territorial entities.175  This a 
common feature of transnational private rule-making. 
Each community may adopt a different metric to define the 
existence and the content of custom.  In agriculture, for example, the 
distinction between production, transformation and distribution 
practices is based on how different communities define their own 
practices.  The former community is composed by farmers, the 
second by the processors of agricultural commodities, the third by 
retailers.  However, even when global institutions like commodity 
exchanges harmonize customary rules, local differences persist.  The 
local and transnational dimensions affect the relevance of the 
community through which the opinio juris ac necessitatis is formed 
and has an impact on judicial recognition.  Domestic courts may use 
different parameters to evaluate whether a custom exists depending 
on its local or international scope and the boundaries of the 
community.   
What characterizes custom is its evolutionary pattern:  
incremental rather than radical and instantaneous, retrospective 
rather than prospective.  It starts with usages that can be repeat 
conducts by a number of the community’s members.  Custom 
                                                     
174  See Gilissen, Consuetudine, supra note 152, at 9 para. 6.  
175  Clearly a different account concerns local customs whose territorial 
features still dominate.  
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becomes binding on the entire community only when the majority 
of its members, at least tacitly, consent.176 
The binding nature of custom should not be confused with its 
(non-existing) mandatory character.  Even when custom is legally 
binding, parties have the opportunity to opt out.177   
To emerge custom presupposes some institutional 
(pre)conditions.  Key determinants are certainly interests’ 
homogeneity and the presence of repeat players.178  (1) Legally 
binding customs are not likely to arise when the community is 
characterized by the presence of heterogeneous and conflicting 
interests.  Rather, this is the domain of regulation, either public or 
private.  In the middle ages when private actors (for example, 
merchants in corporationes) were conferred the power to regulate 
their activities, the decision between enacting ‘statuta’ or developing 
customs was related, among other factors, to the degree of conflict 
of interest among the members of the communities.  When conflicts 
were significant and the emergence of a common and shared rule 
was not likely to happen, they would enact a ‘statutum’.  When 
conflicts were limited, private actors would instead let the rules 
develop on the basis of practices construed with the aid of 
professionals (consilia).  Interests’ homogeneity does not imply lack 
of conflict.  Conflicts in developing a custom are admissible, but 
within a community whose interests are generally aligned.179  This 
feature represents a major difference from transnational private 
regulation and especially from the more recent multistakeholder 
forms that include representatives of industries, governments and 
CSOs.180  (2) Consistent with interests’ homogeneity of custom is the 
repeat player nature of the community’s members.181  Given that 
                                                     
176  See Gilissen, Consuetudine, supra note 152, at 9. 
177  The opt out of custom strategy is much harder in fields of property and 
torts, where parties should explicitly regulate the matter in order to make custom 
inapplicable.  This is in contrast with the contracts field, where parties can state the 
inapplicability of custom to their agreement.  It is commonly accepted that parties 
can opt out of custom by making an explicit reference to the inapplicability of 
custom to their contractual relationship. 
178  See Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional 
Design and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 162 (2004). 
179  Examples of these conflicts range from those concerning time of delivery 
and time of payment to those related to the definition of merchandise.   
180  See Cafaggi, supra note 2. 
181  See Gillette, Institutional Design, supra note 178, at 163. 
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custom arises out of usages that materialize in repeat conducts, such 
repetition is likely to occur when players are the same.  
(3) A third institutional precondition is custom’s observability.182  
For a custom to emerge, the pattern of behavior and the tacit consent 
have to be observable by the members of the community.  
Observability is translated into the legal requirement that the 
custom is known or should have been known to the parties in order 
to become binding.  Modern technologies make behavior among 
distant players observable.  Hence physical proximity and size of 
the community are not any longer institutional preconditions of the 
emergence of customary rules.  Custom may develop in 
communities where players are numerous and far away.  
Observability marks another significant difference from private 
regulation:   since parties have to opt in to private regulation for it 
to be binding, in TPR knowledge is actual and observability is 
unnecessary. 
How are customs enforced?  When customs become binding, 
they can be enforced before a court, but the most powerful 
instrument is conventionally considered extralegal enforcement by 
the community.183  The community, once the custom has been 
recognized as binding, deploys extralegal sanctions to punish 
violations.184  A custom’s modes of enforcement depend on the (1) 
degree of the community’s institutionalization, (2) existence of a 
third party’s enforcer, and (3) relationship between individual and 
collective responsibility.185 
There are different degrees of community’s institutionalization 
within which custom develops; sanctioning regimes change 
accordingly.  When the community is not institutionalized, the 
sanctioning system is primarily, if not exclusively, reputational.186  
The members who do not comply with customary rules can be 
excluded from the trade via refusal to deal.  However, the 
                                                     
182  Id. at 164. 
183  See Vito Piergiovanni, Courts and Commercial Law at the Beginning of the 
Modern Age, in THE COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW (Vito 
Piergiovanni, ed., 1987); Piergiovanni, Diritto Commerciale, supra note 165. But see 
Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 531 (1993). 
184  See Avinish K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of 
Governance, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 7 (2009). 
185  See Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange Without Impartial Law: The Community 
Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 109, 110 (2004). 
186  See Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 166.   
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effectiveness of the administered sanction depends on the size and 
cohesiveness of the community.  Reputational sanctions work where 
there is cohesion of the objectives of the rules and where the 
violation by the individual participant produces negative effects on 
the entire group.  Mutual trust supports the use of reputational 
sanctions.  When the community is institutionalized, enforcing a 
mechanism with a predefined procedural structure can be set up.  A 
system of adjudication is generally composed of laypeople (not 
professional judges) experts in the field.  In relation to the 
enforcement of custom, the sanctioning menu is much richer than 
legal ones, and the sanctions tend to correlate to the gravity of the 
violations and its recurrence (e.g., whether it has occurred in the 
past, between the same parties).  The higher the degree of the 
community’s institutionalization, the closer the enforcement 
mechanisms to those adopted in TPR where increasingly 
independent ‘dispute resolution bodies’ administer sanctions and 
monitor their execution.  
The above description assumes a highly decentralized form of 
rule-making where the usage becomes binding on the basis of its 
spreading across the community that provides tacit consent.  
However, in many instances private institutions have codified 
customs.187  Codifying institutions contribute to reduce uncertainty 
by collecting usages and making them publicly available.  The 
paradigmatic contemporary example is offered by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), but many specialized institutions 
collect usages in relation to particular areas of finance, commerce 
and trading or in agriculture and in professions.  Clearly the very 
definition of custom may change if instead of a spontaneous process 
of incremental consolidation, specific institutions perform the task 
of identifying and collecting the usages to ‘transform’ them into a 
legally binding custom.  Codification of customs is performed by 
different institutions:  the individual global supply chain, the 
industry, and the market.  In many instances, these codifications are 
not themselves binding.  They are purely informative.  They become 
binding when trading platforms make compliance an entry 
                                                     
187  See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange; Chicago Climate Exchange available 
at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@iodcms/documents/ 
file/rercmecbot072613.pdf. 
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requirement or when chain leaders require compliance with best 
practices as a prerequisite for accessing the chain.188 
Does the process of customs’ codification change the nature of 
custom as a form of incremental and spontaneous transnational 
private rule-making?189  It depends!  The nature of custom does not 
change if codification is simply an instrument to collect and organize 
conceptually practices developed incrementally by the business 
community.  If, instead, codification superimposes the codifiers’ 
view, be them academics or practitioners, to what happens in 
practice, it changes the nature of custom.  A business association that 
defines strict rules and strong barriers to entry for those subject to 
the rules does not fit with this definition of custom and is much 
closer to an industry self-regulatory regime.  For the purpose of the 
comparison, the article considers forms of custom’s codification that 
reflect the evolution of practices rather than the conceptual 
framework of the codifiers.  The legitimacy and authority of custom 
is based on the community’s practice and consent.  However, the 
functional difference between custom and private regulation 
remains even when including codifications that transform the 
incremental process and crystallize it into private legislation.  
Customary rules are ‘exchange facilitators’.  Customary rules are not 
meant primarily to regulate market failures.  At most, they reduce 
transaction costs by creating common trading rules that harmonize 
or standardize practices.190  They do not have stated regulatory 
objectives like those defined in TPR:  complying with rule of law and 
human rights, increasing product safety and environmental 
protection, enhancing transparency in financial markets, or more 
industrial policy oriented objectives such as increasing the volume 
of trade, internationalizing markets, and granting SMEs access to 
global supply chains.   
In addition, as it is clearly showed by Choi and Gulati, the 
presence of a transnational private regulator like ISDA permits 
immediate and coherent reactions to courts’ (mis)interpretation of 
                                                     
188   This has been demonstrated, in relation to agriculture, through the 
regulations enacted by different exchanges such as those in New York and Chicago. 
189  It clearly does for those who believe that custom is oral and not written 
since by definition codification implies shifting from verbal to written.  However 
the process of custom’s codification is old and goes back to Roman and medieval 
law.  Medieval jurists believed that ‘consuetudo’ could be codified.  See Gilissen 
Consuetudine, supra note 152, ¶ 3, 18.    
190  See FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING (2009); 
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). 
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the regulatory regime that cannot be triggered when ‘impersonal’ 
markets without a visible hand are at work.191  This is the case in 
custom, where dispersed and uncoordinated market players cannot 
define an effective regulatory strategy to counteract ‘unexpected’ 
judicial interpretations.  
 
7. COMPARING PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL FORMS OF RULE-
MAKING:  DIFFERENCES AND COMMON FEATURES 
 
The foregoing analysis shows that the role of private actors in 
global rule-making differs quite significantly across sectors and it is 
not easily reconcilable within a single set of distinct features.  The 
differences can be analyzed along four dimensions:  actors, 
procedures, instruments and effects. 
 
7.1.  Actors  
 
The differences between custom and TPR in relation to actors are 
remarkable.  Custom is characterized, even in its broadest spectrum, 
by the involvement of merchants.  Civil society organizations do not 
play a significant role in the development of customary commercial 
rules.  Interests of private actors in custom are generally aligned and 
homogenous or, better, become aligned and homogenous at the end 
of the process.192  TPR, on the contrary, is characterized by a much 
broader variety of private actors participating in the rule-making 
process with different objectives.  Within the industry, different and 
often conflicting interests exist.193  Conflicts may reflect size (which 
                                                     
191  See Choi & Gulati, supra note 138 at 149 (comparing the pari passu clause 
in sovereign debt contracts and derivatives swap contracts based on ISDA master 
agreement. “The existence of ISDA allows the swaps market to respond to 
unexpected court interpretations of contractual ambiguities much differently than 
the sovereign debt market”). 
192  Custom becomes legally binding only when interests are aligned and there 
is consensus. 
193  Recently, the conflicts over transnational standard setting and 
implementation have also involved SMEs.  A typical conflict is between 
multinationals and SMEs operating within the same regimes like in the 
agricultural-food industry.  They have different capacities to comply and are often 
involved in distributional conflicts concerning the allocation of compliance’s costs 
with the standards.   
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in turn reflects different technological and financial capabilities) as 
those between multinationals and smallholders or may arise 
between producers and retailers within global chains.194  The 
existence of conflicting objectives is reflected both on governance 
and standard setting procedures.   
The changes towards wider interests’ representation in TPR are 
mainly stimulated or even led by CSOs.  CSOs often represent 
interests conflicting with those of firms, i.e. the regulated entities.  
CSOs can play either a leading role running governing the scheme 
themselves or an ancillary role, taking part in governance 
organizations that run the regulatory process.  Increasingly TPR 
regimes include tripartite (multistakeholder) organizations 
encompassing states or governments, in addition to industries and 
CSOs.195  The involvement of public actors and CSOs is often the sign 
of the public interest goal playing a more relevant role in TPR than 
in custom.   
Hence, TPR is increasingly moving towards wider participation 
and inclusion as a response to the accountability deficit criticisms.  
The inclusiveness of the regulatory process, which might not always 
be reflected in the organizational governance, answers the need to 
involve constituencies without membership that nevertheless may 
be (negatively) affected by the implementation of the standards.  
Similar trends are not observable in contemporary law merchants’ 
making.  When drafting standard contracts forms the International 
chamber of commerce (ICC) does not involve the potentially 
affected stakeholders who may either gain or lose from the adoption 
of specific contractual clauses.  At ICC drafting contracts is 
conceived rather as a technical process that involves practitioners in 
the field.  No impact analysis is carried to evaluate losers and 
                                                     
 194  See S. Henson and J. Humphrey, The Impact of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-setting Processes (May 2009) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/sps/docs/private_standa
rds_codex_en.pdf (prepared for FAO/WHO); Joint FAO/Who Food Standards 
Program, ‘Codex Alimentarius Commission, 33rd Session, Consideration of the 
Impact of Private Standards’ (Geneva, Switzerland, 5-9 July 2010) available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex../Meetings/CAC/cac33/cac33_13e.pdf. 
195  See the membership of ICOC available at http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_September_2013_-_Composite_List2. 
pdf, the one of the Round table on sustainable biofuel available at 
http://www.rspo.org/members?keywords=&member_type=&member_ 
category=&member_country=All), and similarly the one of the Round table on 
sustainable palm oil (available at http://rsb.org/about/organization/member-
list/).   
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winners and the distributional effects of model contract drafting.  
The compromise among conflicting interests is limited to the 
dialogue between enterprises represented within ICC without the 
active involvement of other stakeholders! 
Custom, to become legally binding, presupposes some degree of 
interest homogeneity and a relative cohesive business community.  
TPR on the contrary is often based on the co-existence of conflicting 
interests and objectives.  Its binding nature is compatible with 
conflicts.  This distinction results in different organizational and 
governance responses and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
7.2.  Procedures 
 
The formation of legally binding custom is incremental and 
decentralized.196  It is retrospective and backward looking.  The 
process of customary rule-making is based on consolidation of 
practices among traders belonging to the (broadly speaking) same 
community.197  Such consolidation can occur in different ways, 
ranging from hard codification to collection of references, to 
practices identified by experts.198  The personal scope of custom is 
often undetermined.  There is not a legal definition of the relevant 
community to which custom is applied and the determination of 
communities’ boundaries often occurs through ex post litigation. 
Transnational regulatory regimes operate as private legislatures 
with procedures that determine ex ante the different stages of the 
rule-making process.199  They are prospective and forward-
looking. 
TPR is neither incremental nor decentralized.  It is generally 
designed by a regulator on the basis of standard setting procedures; 
                                                     
196  The term decentralized has kin this context a Hayekian connotation.  See 
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:  The Structural Approach 
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1700 (1996); Eric A. 
Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Avery 
Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1752 (1996). 
197  In medieval times, these rules applied to the members of guilds and the 
relationships between them. Only exceptionally they were applied to foreign 
merchants and almost never to non-merchants. 
198  The legal value of these codifications changes accordingly.  The recognition 
of the binding force may differ depending on the internal or external perspective:  
whether it is seen from the community of traders or from the legislation.   
199  Id.  
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it is not the product of a spontaneous aggregation of regulated 
entities’ conducts.200  It has increasingly become formalized.  
Procedural requirements have been introduced to protect the 
interests of affected stakeholders who, lacking membership, cannot 
use the organizational toolkit that provides participatory and voting 
rights.  Different issues concern those negatively affected by the 
standard and those that can suffer harm from non-compliance.  The 
latter are stakeholders that would benefit from the standard when it 
is complied with.201  The former bear the costs of the standard’s 
implementation.  Both potentially conflicting interests have to be 
taken into account according to many TPR procedures.202 
Many regimes are binding at time of birth:  an incremental 
process is not required to achieve the status of a binding set of 
rules.203  What may be incremental is the degree of compliance 
according to the logic of continuous improvement.  Full compliance 
is frequently subject to a timeline, depending on the capabilities of 
each regulated entity to meet the requirements.204  Hence the rules 
are immediately binding but compliance may be subject to different 
time horizons depending on the size, in particular the financial and 
administrative skills, of regulated entities.   
Depending on the personal or territorial scope TPR may adopt 
different institutional designs.  Where the scope is territorial both 
standard setting and compliance may encompass multiple 
‘administrative’ levels.  In order to accommodate local differences 
the regime may be composed of two, and increasingly three layers, 
including one global, one regional and one national level.205  Such a 
                                                     
200  For this distinction see New Foundations, supra note 68, at 31. 
201  See id. at 32. 
202  For a broader analysis see R. Stewart, Disregard, supra at note 66. 
203  As we have seen, there are a small number of regimes where the rules are 
not binding and compliance is recommended.  This is the case of EASA the private 
regulator operating in the field of advertising where the main tool is represented 
by best practices recommended to the national SROs.  
204  See, e.g., the UTZ Certified, Core Code of Conduct Version 1.0 (2014), 
available at http://www.utzcertified-trainingcenter.com/ewExternalFiles/EN% 
20UTZ%20Core%20Code%20for%20Individual%20Certification%202014.pdf. 
Under the UTZ Core Code of Conduct, compliance with the requirements can be 
achieved over 4 years.  The Code defines mandatory voluntary (additional) 
requirements and their ration changes over time.  The first year is 60/60, the second 
year is 87/33, the third is 103/17 and the fourth is 113/7.  Over the 4 years 53 
requirements shift from voluntary to mandatory. 
205  See, for example, in the field of certification the model adopted by 
GLOBALGAP or in the field of advertising the model adopted by EASA. 
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multilevel structure is missing when the scope is designed 
functionally rather than territorially.  The relevant community of 
regulated entities is identified by formal rules that define both the 
membership and the effects of the rules.  As we have seen, the 
predominant is membership-based while the alternative model is 
that of free or for sale standards to which regulated entities can 
individually commit.206 In the latter case, the community is shaped 
by individual choices of regulated entities that subscribe to the 
regime.  Absent membership and organizational forms, regulated 
entities do not form a cohesive group and lack decision-making 
power.  The collective dimension is very limited and the relationship 
between regulators and regulated rather loose.  It is the use of the 
standard and its market share that determines the success or the 
failure of the regime. 
 
7.3.  Instruments 
 
The rule-making and enforcement instruments also differ.  
Usages and customs arise out of contractual practices by individual 
traders that   consolidate over time and may be collected in private 
or intergovernmental codifications.  There is not a single regulator, 
rather the regulatory process is based on incremental consolidation 
of decentralized practices.  Once usages and customs become 
binding, members of the trading community may be bound by the 
rules unless they opt out.  Up to that moment, parties have to opt in 
the usages or custom, making a specific and express commitment.  
Within usages, the collection of contract terms and clauses is rather 
common.  The creation of a market might be the outcome of the 
process of developing customary rules.  As we have seen, 
transnational contract forms and terms are also used in private 
regulation.  In the latter case, however, they primarily serve the 
purpose of implementing international public and private 
standards; broadening their scope by pursuing regulatory 
objectives.  The existence of conflicting interests typical of TPR does 
not prevent the standardization of contracts by the transnational 
regulator.  On the contrary! Once the compromise is reached on the 
                                                     
206  This commitment can occur on the basis of an agreement between the 
standard setter and the regulated entities (for example in the case of GFSI or that of 
Equator principles with the adoption agreement) or on the basis of a unilateral 
declaration or a code of conduct enacted by the regulated entity.  
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standard or on the framework contract, deviations from standards 
by individually regulated entities are much rarer in TPR than in 
customary law. 
In TPR, the standards are defined ex ante through detailed 
standard setting procedures that are followed by regulators.  
Regulatory instruments to design and implement standards vary 
depending on the functions they perform: codes of conduct, 
rulebooks, guidelines and best-practice recommendations.  The use 
of regulatory contracts suggests that the process of norm making is 
consensual, but consent by regulated entities is expressed ex ante. 
Contracts are commonly used to implement transnational 
regulatory standards.  In order to reduce transaction costs and 
harmonize rules among market or supply chain participants, private 
regulators design standard contract forms or suggest incorporation 
of standard terms and conditions in commercial contracts by 
regulated entities between them or with third parties.  The standard 
is articulated in a code of conduct or in guidelines and rulebooks 
and then applied by parties in a commercial contract.  
If standards address externalities, they state principles that 
regulated entities have to “transpose” into contractual clauses when 
engaging third parties.  In product safety, if the code of conduct 
imposes compliance with a hazard analysis control point (HACCP), 
the parties have to define contractual terms, rights, and obligations 
that can implement a safety management scheme.  In advertising, 
the advertiser and the media include contract clauses concerning 
compliance with codes related to deceptiveness, fairness, and 
decency.207  TPR deploys contracts to implement standards.  Safety 
standards produced by IATA in relation to civil aviation are 
incorporated in bilateral or multiparty production contracts 
between airlines and their suppliers.208  Data protection standards 
are incorporated into contracts between search engines and 
consumers.209  Privacy policies are incorporated into sales contracts 
                                                     
207  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ADVERTISING AND 
MARKETING COMMUNICATION PRACTICE, Consolidated International Chamber of 
Commerce Code, art. 26 (explaining advertising and marketing communication 
marketing practices). 
208  See Brian F. Havel and Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex Aviatica, 42 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 639, 639 (2011) (detailing industry standards in international 
commercial air travel). 
209  See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.it/intl/en/ 
policies/terms/regional.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (“Google’s privacy 
policies explain how we treat your personal data and protect your privacy when 
you use our Services.  By using our Services, you agree that Google can use such 
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between electronic platforms and customers.210  Human rights 
regimes are incorporated in contracts between diamond producers 
and retailers211 or in contracts between private military companies 
and their customers.212  Human rights regimes are incorporated in 
lending contracts between banks and other financial institutions and 
borrowers, as with the Equator principles.213   
                                                     
data in accordance with our privacy policies.  We respond to notices of alleged 
copyright infringement and terminate accounts of repeat infringers according to the 
process set out in the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  We provide 
information to help copyright holders manage their intellectual property online.  If 
you think somebody is violating your copyrights and want to notify us, you can 
find information about submitting notices and Google’s policy about responding to 
notices in our Help Center.”); See also, Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO.COM, 
https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) 
(“By accessing and using the Yahoo Services, you accept and agree to be bound by 
the terms and provision of the TOS.  In addition, when using particular Yahoo 
owned or operated services, you and Yahoo shall be subject to any posted 
guidelines or rules applicable to such services, which may be posted and modified 
from time to time.  All such guidelines or rules (including but not limited to our 
Spam Policy) are hereby incorporated by reference into the TOS.  Yahoo may also 
offer other services that are governed by different Terms of Service.  In such cases 
the other terms of service will be posted on the relevant service to which they 
apply.”). 
210  See eBay User Agreement, eBay.com, http://pages.ebay.com/help/ 
policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (“This User Agreement, 
the User Privacy Notice, the Mobile Devices Terms and all policies posted on our 
sites set out the terms on which eBay offers you access to and use of our sites, 
services, applications and tools (collectively “Services”).  You can find an overview 
of our policies here.  All policies, the Mobile Devices Terms, and the User Privacy 
Notice are incorporated into this User Agreement.  You agree to comply with all 
the above when accessing or using our Services.”). 
211  See System of Warranties, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, https://www. 
worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/System%20of%20W
arranties%20WDC%202014.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (requiring each buyer 
and seller of rough diamonds, polished diamonds and jewelry containing 
diamonds to make the following affirmative statement on all invoices: “The 
diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not 
involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions.  
The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on 
personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these 
diamonds.”). 
212  See Laura Dickinson, Public/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 
(Jody Freeman & Martha Mino eds., 2009) (detailing the pervasive outsourcing of 
U.S. government work to private actors and the clash with traditional American 
values); Carsten Hoppe & Ottavio Quirico, Codes of Conduct for Private Military and 
Security Companies, in WAR BY CONTRACT 362 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino 
Ronzitti eds., 2011) (explaining the state of self-regulation in the military and 
security industry).     
213  See, Guidance for EPFIS on Incorporating Environmental and Social 
Considerations into Loan Documentation, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
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If the purpose of the regulatory regime designing a market, 
rather than implementing a standard, the regulatory instrument 
imposes or recommends to traders the use of executory contracts 
that partly reflect the framework or master agreement and partly 
regulate the specific relationship.214  This can be done in different 
ways:  (1) through standardized bilateral contracts designed by the 
regulator; (2) through a multiparty contract applicable to all trading 
partners; or (3) through a rulebook that defines contractual terms to 
be applied by individual traders in their contractual relationships.  
Instruments of private regulation are not confined within 
contracts.  In TPR, a wider variety of instruments is deployed, 
ranging from property rights to regulatory contracts; from the law 
of associations and foundations to corporate and trust law.215   
Enforcement mechanisms differ between custom and TPR.  
While merchant courts are composed by members of the same 
business community using primarily non-legal sanctions, in TPR 
enforcement is increasingly performed by third parties - 
independent from standard setters - subject to formalized 
procedural rules implementing due process, fair trial, and effective 
remedies principles.  At times, the vertical relationship between 
enforcer and disputants is supplemented by peer monitoring in 
order to implement reputational mechanisms.  In TPR the 
sanctioning system is often the result of a combination of legal and 
extra-legal sanctions.  These differences with law merchants can be 
explained by the degrees of heterogeneity and conflicts within the 
private sphere and by the relevance of regulatory beneficiaries and 
                                                     
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/ep_guidance_for_epfis_on_ 
loan_documentation_march_2014.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015)) (“It  is  not  a  
requirement  to  include  the  Equator  Principles  Action  Plan  as  an  Annex  in  
the  loan agreement.  If an Equator Principles Action Plan has been agreed, the loan 
agreement should, as a minimum, contain  a  reference  to  this  plan,  and/or  
conditions  precedent/subsequent  in  order  to have the clients’ commitment to 
comply with the plan.”  However, it further affirms “Where a client is not in 
compliance with its environmental and social covenants, the EPFI will work with 
the client on remedial actions to bring it back into compliance to the extent feasible. 
If the client fails to re-establish compliance within an agreed grace period, the EPFI 
reserves the right to exercise remedies, as considered appropriate.”). 
214    See Choi & Gulati, supra note 138, at 149 (showing the distinction between 
economic and noneconomic terms). 
215  Depending on the legal form of the regulatory body, the relationship 
between regulators and regulated is subject to the law of association or nonprofit 
corporations or to that of contract law.  In the latter instance the regulated is bound 
by a regulatory contract signed with the organization. 
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third parties in private regulation.216  Merchant courts work in a 
context of homogenous communities where interests are usually 
aligned.217  When interests and objectives are divergent or 
conflicting, more formalized and impartial enforcement regimes 
become necessary.  The other factor influencing different 
enforcement mechanisms is the role of affected stakeholders.  As we 
have seen, different issues concern those negatively affected by the 
standard if implemented and those that can suffer harm from non-
compliance.218  The latter should be considered regulatory 
beneficiaries of the regime, but may suffer detriment for 
infringements of the standard.  The communities of stakeholders 
that may be positively affected by compliance require access to 
dispute resolution mechanisms to limit the negative consequences 
of non-compliance.  The effectiveness of regulatory regimes is 
primarily (albeit not exclusively) dependent upon their ability to 
participate in the rule-making process and have access to ex post 
internal review.219  
 
7.4.  Effects 
 
The definition of “effects” concerns the personal scope of the 
private regime based on customary or regulatory law.  To whom 
does it apply?  How is the domain of application defined and by 
whom?  What is the shape of the community of regulated entities?  
Custom applies primarily to the community of traders, but it can 
extend beyond the community.220  How such a community is defined 
                                                     
216  Id. 
217  Medieval merchant courts applied lex mercatoria also to relationships with 
non-merchants, generally protecting merchants’ interests at the expenses of other 
communities like artisans or agricultural producers.  Current merchant courts 
apply almost exclusively to relationships among merchants, whereas transnational 
private law (the contemporary jus commune) applies to relationships between 
merchants and non-merchants. 
218  See Stewart Disregard, supra note 84, at 213 (explaining the relative harms of 
bad implementation and non-compliance). 
219  An important function is also played by domestic courts exercising judicial 
review.  However, legal systems distinguish the judicial power to review regulation 
depending on their public or private nature or on the pursuit of public interest and 
public function. 
220  Baldo degli Ubaldi, and then Benvenuto Stracca (tractatus de mercatura 
seu mercatore), distinguished between the power to regulate and the personal 
scope of the regulation.  See Baldo In Decretalium Volumen Commentaria, Venetiis, 
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is not clearly determined.  Within the codification process of custom, 
there is often an effort to define the boundaries of the community, 
but many times its extent is variable and flexible.   
In TPR the instruments to define the regime’s personal scope are 
much clearer:  as to the regulated entities it is (1) membership when 
the regime is regulated by an organization-like association, or it is 
(2) contract between the regulator and the regulated when the 
foundational model is deployed.221  However, the regulatory 
function of the private regime implies that the standard’s 
implementation produces effects on third parties; the consumers, 
the investors, the human rights holders would benefit from 
compliance and be harmed by infringements.  When a standard 
defines the safety of a product, compliance reduces consumer risks, 
whereas the lack of compliance increases them.  These forms of 
regulation differ from conventional self-regulation because there is 
no coincidence between regulators and regulated. 
A second important difference of effects concerns the distinction 
between territorial and functional scope.  Custom, according to the 
more recent findings, tends to be local and geographically 
circumscribed.  TPR is often defined functionally.  The relevant 
community of regulated is identified by the regulatory objectives - 
safety, financial stability, and consumer protection, and by the 
geographical location of the regulated entities.   In fact, the different 
geographical operations of global supply chain make the territorial 
scope hard to define.   
  
                                                     
MDXCV, c. 104 v.n. 48, (“Quaero ecce mercatores habent judicem mercantiae, 
nunquid non merctarores possunt eius jurisditionem prorogare seu adire? Resp. 
non: quia municipalis non potest prorogari seu ampliari. . .” quoted by V. 
Piergiovanni, Statuti diritto comune e processo mercantile, in Norme, scienza e 
pratica giuridica tra Genova e l’occidente medievale e moderno, Genova, 2012, p.  
1105 ff at . 1108 fn. 15 stating: “Piu’ complesso il problema della validita’ degli 
statuti presso altri tribunali: Baldo non ne accetta la limitazione per i soli iscritti alla 
corporazione, ma esclude che i giudici ordinari possano applicare disposizioni 
statutarie che non riguardano i mercatores ma siano relative ai giudici mercantili 
stessi e all’ordo juris.”). 
221  See Cafaggi, supra note 2, at 14, 17 (comparing different modes of 
transnational private regulation). 
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In light of the foregoing differences, what are the implications 
concerning the foundations of private norm-making power?  Is there 
a common foundation of private rule-making or does it differ? 
The different features suggest that foundations of transnational 
private rule-making are not the same in Custom and TPR.  While, 
in the case of custom, private autonomy and freedom of contract can 
be the source of legitimacy, this is certainly not enough in TPR.  The 
legitimacy of a transnational regulatory regime cannot depend only 
on the consent of the parties that join the regime since the effects go 
beyond their respective spheres.  Many stakeholders affected by the 
standard are unable to express consent or dissent.  What provides 
legitimacy to the regulatory regime is not only the expression of 
consent by regulated entities, but also the inclusiveness, the 
transparency of the process, and proportionality of the regulatory 
product (the standard).  Procedural requirements related to the 
process and the final regulatory products are a necessary 
component of the legitimacy towards affected stakeholders that do 
not belong to the community of regulated entities.  The validity of 
these rules depends on their legitimacy.  Consent by the regulated 
is not enough; affected stakeholders have to participate and confer 
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(input and throughput) legitimacy.222  When judicially reviewed, 
transnational private regimes can be stricken down by judges even 
if they have been expressly consented upon.  Private autonomy and 
consent are necessary, but are not sufficient conditions to ensure 
normative character to the rules.  They have to be combined with 
procedural rules that grant third parties access and control, enabling 
contestation, e.g., access to dispute resolution. 
 
8. AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
To map and to understand transnational private law making, it 
is essential to make comparisons among the different modes of the 
standards’ production and the various domains over which they 
develop, stabilize, and decline.  “What are the combinations 
between legal and social norms in standard setting and 
enforcement” is a key question to differentiate the various forms.  
Comparative analysis of transnational private regulation, customs, 
and jura mercatorum is at its very early stage.  Issues concerning (1) 
why different private regimes emerge, (2) how they spread, and (3) 
why they decline over time are still largely unexplored.  As to TPR, 
such questions have been raised in relation to specific sectors.  But 
comprehensive inter-sectoral analyses are still lacking.  These forms, 
it has been contended here, have existed for a long time and 
developed in connection with the transformations of the public 
sphere and, in the last centuries, of the State as the dominant unit of 
analysis.223   
Four themes should be subject to further comparative 
investigation:  (1) the different functional partition between local 
and global private regimes (more specifically, a comparison 
                                                     
222  Id. at 11 (outlining the common interests of the regulated and the 
stakeholders); Cafaggi, supra note 68, at 4 (explaining the role stakeholders can play 
in regulation). 
223  See Edward Ballesein, Rights of Way, Red Flags, and Safety Valves: Business 
Self-Regulation and State-Building in the United States 1 (Kenan Institute for Ethics, 
Working Paper No. 1, 2012) (telling the history behind self-regulation in the U.S. 
business community).  See also Edward Ballesein & Marc Eisner, The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public 
Purpose, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127 (David Moss & John Cisternino 
eds., 2009) (examining the role nongovernmental actors can play in regulatory 
development); William Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, 
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 23 (Jody Freeman & Martha Mino eds., 2009). 
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between domestic and transnational forms of private regulation); (2) 
the techniques (i.e., indicators) to measure the success and failure of 
transnational private regulation and custom; (3) the different modes 
of integrating transnational private rules into domestic and 
international public legal orders; and (4) the different distributional 
impacts and effects of private regulation and customary rules.  
Other relevant aspects of a research agenda include:  the use of 
private regulation and custom to regulate, increase or decrease 
competition, the different nature of legal and non-legal instruments, 
and the various criteria to draw the boundaries between social and 
legal norms. 
Both TPR and customs include local and global components.  
The local or global nature of rulemaking is not a static feature.  Local 
customs and regimes have become global, gaining dominance over 
competitors.  Global customs and regulatory regimes have declined 
and, in some instances, have become local, whereas in other 
instances they have altogether disappeared.  Studying TPR and 
customs from an evolutionary perspective demonstrates that the 
boundaries between local and global are diachronically mobile and 
sector or market specific. 
The debate on transnational private law making is often 
characterized by lack of data concerning their effectiveness.  
Effectiveness should be measured within the private sphere both 
between alternative modes and between private and public regimes.  
We still lack appropriate indicators that can be used to engage in a 
comparative analysis instrumental to policy decision-making.224 
Both transnational regulation and customary rules have huge 
distributional impacts.  They transfer power, wealth, and 
capabilities between communities of private actors, between 
communities and states and between states.  The dominance of a 
regulatory regime or that of a custom marks the temporary victory 
of one standard over competing ones and has large socioeconomic 
impacts on communities, transferring wealth and power within and 
between them.  The nature and features of distributional effects are 
largely unexplored both by the transnational regulators and by the 
institutions engaged in collecting customs.  It is strongly 
                                                     
224  See Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 9, at 115 (explaining the use of indicators 
in measuring regulations).  For a general overview of indicators as instruments of 
governance see Davis & Kingsbury, INDICATORS AS GOVERNANCE, OUP, 2013. 
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recommended that shared indicators to measure distributional 
impacts be used in policy design by international organizations.225 
A fourth area is that of integration of transnational private 
standards into both domestic and international legal orders.  How 
are customs and regulatory regimes integrated?  There are 
important contributions concerning the technique of incorporation, 
but many other techniques have developed to provide private 
regimes a legal status and ensure general application.  Open issues 
concern the applicability of domestic techniques of legal integration 
to transnational private standards.  Recent research on the EU shows 
that a piecemeal approach, rather than a coordinated and consistent 
approach, is used to integrate transnational standards into the EU 
legal order.226  Similarly the UN system does not have general 
principles to define forms of private standards’ integration.  The 
WTO code of practice represents a point of reference but it does not 




Transnational regulatory regimes generated by private actors 
have witnessed a rapid and unexpected increase.  This process has 
been caused by significant transformations in global value chains, 
global trade and international markets, combined with a stronger 
role played by CSOs.  This article has delved into whether the newly 
created regimes resemble and can be easily associated to 
conventional jura mercatorum and customs.  This question has both 
theoretical and practical implications.  From the theoretical and 
historical viewpoint, it asks whether TPR simply constitutes a 
development of jus mercatorum and customary law or reflects 
different needs connected to the changing instruments and 
objectives of international public policies related to market design 
and regulation.  From the policy perspectives, it forces one to rethink 
different approaches to transnational private rulemaking by states 
and international organizations. 
                                                     
225  For example, the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises and their 
impact on global supply chains should be supported by a much deeper 
distributional analysis of the standards.  
226  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Integrating Global Standards into the European Union, on 
file with the author. 
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The new forms differ from both custom and jura mercatorum. 
Differences concern both processes and objectives.  The new private 
regulatory regimes are generated by different private actors - often 
with conflicting interests - through processes similar to those 
deployed in public legislation or international treaty making.  The 
new regimes are trying to address these conflicts by internalizing 
trade-offs within the same standard avoiding or mitigating the 
conflicts.  TPR is neither incremental nor decentralized.227  However, 
it is multilevel and composed of two (and increasingly, three) layers 
including a global, a regional, and a national level when the scope is 
geographic.228  In TPR, standard setting and enforcement procedures 
are defined and approved ex ante.  For rulemaking, monitoring, and 
enforcement private regulators are bound to abide by the rules 
designed by themselves or by meta private regulators.   
Customs, on the contrary, are generally created by homogenous 
communities that produce legal rules through repeat behavior.  
They become binding on the communities retrospectively, after 
sufficient consent becomes clear.  It is gradual, incremental, and 
unstable.  The legal requirements that transform a business practice 
into a legally binding rule do not address the issue of external 
negative effects. 
Functionally, TPRs are characterized by regulatory functions 
that not only address different types of market failures but also solve 
collective action problems in contexts where states’ regulatory 
capacities are limited at best.  Customs, on the other hand, regulate 
exchanges and trading, but rarely address externalities and the 
production of public goods. 
Unlike jus mercatorum and custom, where private collective 
autonomy constitutes the foundations of rule-making power and 
provides the legitimacy of their normativity, these new regimes 
involve third parties’ interests to a much greater extent.  The public 
interest function - which differentiates them from conventional self-
regulation - calls for procedural and substantive requirements that 
ensure legitimacy and effectiveness.  Collective private autonomy is 
integrated and limited by the pursuit of public interest and the 
necessity to comply with the rule of law. 
These differences suggest that the relationship with public 
orders - both at the transnational and domestic level - should be 
                                                     
227  This is not to say that it is not evolutionary and multilevel.  
228  Such a multilevel structure is lacking when the scope is functional and not 
territorial.   
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regulated differently from custom and other forms of privately 
produced rules.  The techniques of incorporation, usually applied to 
usages and customs, cannot be mechanically transplanted to TPRs.  
The legal status of these regimes and their binding nature can be 
certainly evaluated through the lenses of contract and 
organizational law.  However, the applicability of these regimes to 
parties that have not participated in the regulatory process in any 
meaningful way should be subject to complementary forms of 
inclusion.  Clearly, tacit consent of the community, the milestone of 
custom’s normativity, cannot play a role to transform regulatory 
regimes into binding rules.  It is the combination of private 
autonomy and procedural requirements that ultimately provides 
the necessary legitimacy to ensure compliance with global private 
standards.  
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